There is an overwhelming sense of déjà vu in Kashmir today. This could have been deemed tiresome but for the grave implications it has for us as a nation, and as a people. We are now used to long cycles of violence interspersed by political ennui or tokenism and the ubiquitous ‘economic package’ which only serves to open up newer avenues for corruption in a state orphaned by history and politics for over six decades.
The Andaman and Nicobar islands are of immense strategic significance for India. The geographical configuration and the location of the island chain in the Bay of Bengal safeguards India's eastern seaboard as well the approaches to the Indian Ocean from the east. Its proximity to the Southeast Asian region enables India to forge friendly relations with its Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours. The physical isolation and remoteness of the archipelago, however, make it vulnerable to conventional and non-conventional threats.
The Chinese territorial claim on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh has negatively affected India–China relations for many decades now. In recent years, China has become visibly aggressive with regard to its territorial claim by denying visas to Indians from Arunachal Pradesh travelling to China, claiming that they are Chinese citizens and hence do not require visas. China also tried to block ADB aid sought by India for the state.
Left Wing Extremism (LWE) presents a serious internal security challenge to India that needs careful and coordinated policy response from both the security front and the development front. For the CPI (Maoists) (Communist Party of India), the main outfit propagating LWE, the plan and execution of this style of people's war against the state is like the Churchillian ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. At one level, the LWE can be described as a ‘Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people's war of strategic defensive’.
There is a view that India's approach to national security is largely ad hoc and marked by incompetence. Indians as well as foreign commentators on the country's security policies seem to share this perception. However, India does have a security approach that has a discernible pattern and arguably has been a success. This comment focuses on how India has dealt with internal security since independence.
Terrorism in the Indian hinterland is the result of a complex set of inter-related factors. The development of a jihad culture in Pakistan during the course of the Afghan conflict in the 1980s led to the subsequent Pakistani decision to employ jihad against India as a strategy. The mobilisation of the Hindu Right in India and ensuing communal violence led to the radicalisation of Muslim youth and the resort to terrorism by both Indian Islamists and Muslim criminal networks with help from Pakistan.
The Indian culture and civilization embodies a unique blend of peace and conflict trajectories. This historical legacy has indubitably moulded the course of our policy and action. However, there are aspects which are queried and contested. For instance, how do we reconcile the ambiguities and opposing claims on peacefulness in Indian lineage? The paper reflects afresh on some of these lingering contestations and decodes the historical transferences in the subcontinental thinking and popular imagination.
The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.
Choking the flow of funds to terrorists is one of the vital aspects of combating terrorism. While its importance has been realized post 9/11 by the international community, counter measures for terrorist financing remain largely ineffective. In India, more resources and effort need to be devoted to launch a financial war against terrorists. In this context, the article attempts to establish the significance of emerging challenges in denying funds to terrorists globally and recommends a focused national response by outlining an integrated strategy.
Based on interviews with a cross-section of people from the Kashmir Valley including aspirants of self-determination, academics, media persons, members of the civil society, and security forces this article argues that perceptions about identity are central to the conflict in Kashmir Valley. Having successfully stemmed the tide of armed conflict militarily, it is now crucial for the government to take cognizance of and address these issues in an appropriate manner as management of these perceptions will be critical to bringing enduring peace to the Kashmir Valley.
