Insurgency and terrorism are not new to India. Threats are manifold and come from divergent militant outfits. Their demands include greater regional autonomy, independence, the overthrow of the “bourgeoisie”, and dismantling the democratic structure of the Indian polity. The cluster’s research efforts are focused on insurgencies in the Northeast, Maoist (Naxalism) violence, management of India’s borders, coastal security and trends in global terrorism.
Current projects being pursued by the cluster include:
The cluster is also involved in various training programmes organized at the Institute for senior Military Officers, Foreign Service probationers, and officers of the Indian Police Service.
|Research Fellow||Research Fellow||Associate Fellow|
February 28, 2014
The recent violent incidents carried out by the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) in the sensitive eastern and north-eastern parts India have serious security implications. Conscious intervention of the centre in concert with the state governments of West Bengal and Assam and even Sikkim, as well as with cooperation of the Bhutan government is required at the earliest.
February 17, 2014
Citing IDSA Report, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, RSN Singh said in the Rajya Sabha recently that “…the CPI(Maoist) party has been collecting not less than Rs 140 crores annually from a variety of sources. Further, the possibility of certain front organizations of the CPI (Maoist) … clandestinely getting foreign funds cannot be ruled out.”
February 10, 2014
India’s security strategy for the economic corridors and connectivity will have to entail water tight anti-drugs control measures and mechanisms to snuff out the possibilities of surges in narcotics trafficking that may result from better connectivity and established networks of peoples across the region.
February 5, 2014
To reshape public confidence further, the Union Home Ministry should quickly address the long festering issue of redeploying at least one regiment of the sashastra seema bal (SSB) in Ladakh. Initially raised as Special Service Bureau in the 1960s, SSB effectively involved natives for building a second line of defence against adversaries.
January 27, 2014
The CPI (Maoist) is fully aware that a movement of this magnitude cannot sustain on its own for long without any external support; be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge or ideological support. Given India’s geopolitical location, it would come as no surprise if the CPI (Maoist), through its aggressive efforts, is able to garner substantive resources for its disposal.
January 24, 2014
The internal security situation in India reflected a marked improvement in 2012-2013 relative to previous years. This Issue Brief offers an assessment of the major trends in 2013 for Jammu and Kashmir, the land borders of India, Naxalism, the Northeast, terrorism and radicalism in India. It also offers a prognosis for the year ahead.
January 23, 2014
Compared to the worst Maoists-affected state of Odisha, in the neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the level of violence has come down substantially. In the coming years, Malkangiri and other south-western border districts of Odisha will continue to bleed because of the Maoist quest for safe havens in these districts during hot pursuit by the Chhattisgarh police.
January 16, 2014
Foremost on the government’s defence and national security reforms agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review and must take the public into confidence.
January 9, 2014
The recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply unable to keep “extortion” networks in check. While the cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by the outfit render the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.
December 27, 2013
In a document entitled ‘Our Financial Policy’, the Maoists mention that they have three types of economic needs, viz. the needs of war, political propaganda and the people. To cater to these needs there are three broad categories of resources, viz. (a) membership fee, levy and contributions from the people; (b) confiscation of the wealth and income of the enemy; and (c) ‘revolutionary taxes’ collected in guerrilla zones and base areas.