Journal of Defence Studies

China Borders: Settlement and Conflicts—Selected Papers, by Neville Maxwell

This book is a compilation of papers written by journalist Neville Maxwell over a career span of five decades. Those who look at China–India relations closely, notably the border dispute, will know that Neville Maxwell is not new to the India–China border discourse. Accredited to The Times, he was their South Asia correspondent in New Delhi during the tumultuous years from 1959–62, when he extensively covered the Indo-China War of 1962.

‘Arriving in the Nick of Time’: The Indian Corps in France, 1914–15

Today, military historians as well as those dealing with colonial South Asian history tend to overlook the fact that during the First World War, the Indian Army was Britain’s strategic reserve. It vitally despatched over 150,000 troops to the Western Front to shore-up the British sector in the critical period of 1914-1915. To the Indian sepoys who crossed the kala pani to fight, die or be wounded in the trenches there, it was a jarring initiation into modern industrialised warfare.

Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India–China Relations, by Tien-sze Fang

Tien-sze Fang’s Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India–China Relations makes a comparative study of the threat perceptions of the two countries vis-à-vis each other. The book endorses the view that although both the countries have security concerns from each other, the threat perception in India is far more acute than in China. This asymmetry defines the relations between the two countries.

Birth of UNLFWSEA: Internal Dynamics and Implications for India’s North-East

A distinctive feature of insurgency in India’s North-East and neighbouring Myanmar has been the tendency among rebel groups to form alliances. Cooperation is deemed advantageous in a hostile terrain, against a powerful and better organised enemy. Several coalitions were formed in Myanmar by the separatist insurgent outfits with well-defined objectives which, however, failed to produce any significant impact on the campaign for independence of the region.

Military Education in India: Missing the Forest for the Trees

India’s Professional Military Education (PME) system is weighted towards the tactical level in all stages of professional development. This results in inadequate exposure of its senior leadership to strategic studies, thus inhibiting the provision of qualitative advice at the strategic level. While combat as an instrument of warfare is focused on at all levels, it fails to relate to war as an instrument of politics. It underlines the absence of an effort to build a broader vision that incorporates the entire constellation of forces.

An Assessment of Organisational Change in the Indian Army

The article analyses military change in the context of the Indian Army, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. In doing so, it analyses two case studies: restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian War of 1962; and mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. On the basis of these case studies, the article assesses the drivers and desirables for organisational change in the Indian Army, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which are especially apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the army.

Indian Defence Offset Policy: An Impact Analysis

The article assesses the impact of defence offset policy on the Indian defence industry, by taking into account two key parameters—foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and exports. It observes that the offset policy has a mixed impact. On the positive side, the offset policy seems to have an impact on certain types of exports. On the negative side, the policy has not been a catalyst in bringing in foreign investment and technology inflows into the Indian defence industry, nor has it been successful in promoting its high-end manufacturing.

The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline M. Karin

The process of ‘War’, whether waged for noble or ignoble ends and for long considered a valid instrument of state policy, is broadly interpreted along the Clausewitzian dictum of the ‘application of organised violence for political ends’. The United Nations (UN) outlaws the proposition that states can use force for resolving their disputes.

Critical Analysis of Pakistani Air Operations in 1965: Weaknesses and Strengths

This article tracks the evolution of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into a potent fighting force by analysing the broad contours of joint operations and the air war between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and PAF in 1965. Led by aggressive commanders like Asghar Khan and Nur Khan, the PAF seized the initiative in the air on the evening of 6 September 1965 with a coordinated strike from Sargodha, Mauripur and Peshawar against four major Indian airfields, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and Jamnagar. The IAF riposte to PAF strikes came early next morning at dawn on 7 September.

Air Power in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War: An Assessment

The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces.