The 1971 Indo-Pak War can be described as the Indian Navy’s (IN’s) finest hour. Until then, save for limited action in Liberation of Goa in 1961 and defensive operations in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the IN had not been called ‘into harm’s way’ or for offensive action in a major manner. Consequently, the spectacular show in 1971 may have surprised or even stunned many observers or analysts in the military/maritime realm.

• Srikant B. Kesnur , M. Doraibabu , Ashish Kale |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

India had all of two weeks to achieve the politico-military end state of liberating Bangladesh, before the international community intervened to impose a ceasefire. Speed and tempo of operations were imperative.Indian Armed Forces exploited the special operations capabilities to ensure an early fall of Dhaka. The airborne assault at Tangail, the audacious helilift of troops across the mighty Meghna by General Sagat Singh with effective support from the Mukti Bahini contributed to the early fall of Dhaka with most defences still intact.

• Vinod Bhatia |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The formation of Bangladesh resulted from the military operations undertaken in erstwhile East Pakistan by the Indian Armed Forces. The Indian Air Force established air superiority in the first few days which enabled land operations to be executed smoothly. The Indian Army outclassed the Pakistan Army by avoiding capture of towns and built-up areas. They headed for the capital Dacca which was the centre of gravity of the operations. The operations were preceded by detailed planning, logistics build up and war gaming which led to outclassing the enemy in the field.

• P.K. Chakravorty |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

India displayed its firm political resolve, robust military capability and deliberate decision-making process in the 1971 India–Pakistan War to achieve significant strategic success. The politico-military strategy evolved progressively from a cautious response to a firm decision to employ the Armed Forces at an appropriate time as the last instrument. India adroitly calibrated an indigenous freedom movement led by Mukti Bahini and concurrently launched a diplomatic outreach campaign to shape the environment in its favour.

• J.S. Cheema |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

Introduction

• Shamsher M. Chowdhury |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The ‘Lightning Campaign’ to liberate Bangladesh during the 1971 IndoPak War was one of the finest moments in Indian history. The ‘Battle of Garibpur’ fought on 21–22 November 1971, before the Indo-Pak War was officially declared on 3 December 1971, was a key battle in East Pakistan where a single infantry battalion, 14 Punjab (Nabha Akal) supported by a squadron of armour and intimate artillery support, successfully fought a Pakistani attack by infantry and armour.

• Vijay Yeshvant Gidh |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The Partition of India in August 1947 was a colossal man-made catastrophe resulting in the formation of Pakistan, with its east and west wings.Jinnah’s two-nation theory ignored the diverse culture and geographical settings. East Pakistan got its first political shock when Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy—a popular mass leader—did not become the chief minister of East Pakistan. Further, in the initial period of state formation, there was forceful imposition of Perso-Arabic culture and Urdu language by the leadership of Pakistan, consisting majorly of Punjabis and Pathans from West Pakistan.

• Guru Saday Batabyal |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

This article seeks to re-analyse the pattern of Pakistani response to the demands from East Bengal as a federating unit with distinct linguistic
and regional identity, which led to eventual vivisection of Pakistan, and examine whether in the post-1971 years Pakistan learnt any lesson from
its Bangladesh experience and used it to deal with similar assertions at ethnic and regional levels.

• Ashok K. Behuria |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The only unfettered use of air power in India’s wars was in 1971, and it produced disproportionate and decisive outcomes. IAF’s air strategy, the extent of its role in contributing to the failure of Pakistan’s strategy in the west, and the vast range of operations carried out towards the surface war on both fronts simultaneously, are relatively unknown.

• Diptendu Choudhury |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

This article looks at the real issues that were responsible for destabilising the centre of gravity of Pakistan Army in the eastern sector. Lieutenant

• Rajesh Isser |
• October–December 2021 |
• Journal of Defence Studies