Vivek Chadha

On February 20, 2016, a Central Reserve Police Force convoy was ambushed at Pampore, just a few kilometres away from the heart of Srinagar town. The terrorists, after achieving initial success, moved into the Entrepreneurship Development Institute(EDI), in the near vicinity of the ambush site. At that time, there were a number of employees and students in the building. Thereafter began a prolonged operation that has continued since over the weekend, leading to the loss of invaluable lives of soldiers.

Amongst those martyred in the encounter are three paratroopers who belong to some of the finest special forces battalions of the Indian Army. It would seem an anomaly at first to hear of such a high casualty figure, especially since the terrorists had sought refuge in a building and had no where to escape thereafter. However, a more deliberate assessment of the situation provides an answer to the harsh reality of everyday operations conducted by the army in these areas.

The presence of civilian population in any operation makes its conduct that much more complex and difficult to handle. The possibility of losing innocent lives in crossfire or worse as a result of people being used as human shields cannot be ruled out under such circumstances.

Second, purely from an operational perspective, it limits the options available to the army to take out terrorists who seek refuge in such buildings. This is especially so when the buildings provide limited avenues of ingress and egress and further do not facilitate a top-down entry from the roof. This was exactly the case with the building in question which has a sloping tin roof and multiple rooms which can be used by terrorists to fire at incoming soldiers. This implies clearing each floor and room physically, more often than not without the knowledge of the exact location of terrorists as also the possibility of presence of civilians.

Third, the easiest solution to neutralising the terrorists is to bring down a building or a house. In this case as well, this could well have been possible. However, over a period of time, the army has deliberately take the precaution of minimising collateral damage during operations, even at the cost of casualty to its troops.

Fourth, the operation was conspicuous by the absence of heavy calibre weapons. This is unlike similar operations that have been conducted in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, where, artillery, drone based precision missiles and rockets were used with impunity. The Indian Army's refusal to do so is again a part of its counterinsurgency ethos of minimum force and strict rules of engagement.

Fifth, the martyrdom of two officers in the operation yet again reinforces the time honoured tradition of the army, which was witnessed during the Kargil conflict as well. It is the officer class and especially the young officers who lead from the front and lead by example. This is one reason why the army continues to remain the bastion of reliability and faith that the nation reposes in it.

It is important to relate this incident to the human rights record of the army, which often gets questioned in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K). This incident clearly reflects the values, procedures and abundant caution that is taken by the army doing the conduct of operations. This is not to say that mistakes have not happened or some personnel have not been culpable of deliberate crimes. In fact, it needs to be reinforced that in approximately 25 years of counter terrorism operations in J&K, 1121 allegations have been received from various sources, including human rights organisations.

Of these the police found it fit to file a first investigation report (FIR) only in 350 cases and the army found prima facie evidence in 72 cases and initiated disciplinary proceedings. This led to conviction of 150 personnel, including 51 officers, 18 JCOs and 81 other ranks. This resulted in punishments varying from dismissal from service to imprisonment in civil jail. In addition, the army also took sou moto cognisance of offences in approximately 100 other cases, without any complaints having been filed.

This further led to the punishment of 52 army personnel. Interestingly, if an assessment of all the cases filed with the police were contrasted with those specifically related to the army, it emerges that at over 150 police stations in J&K, a mere 0.01 per cent relate to human rights violations against the army. This clearly highlights the contrived propaganda that tends to dominate the debate on this issue. It prefers to sideline countless incidents like the one at Pampore, that better reflect the reality of counter terrorism actions in the state.

The contention of some human rights groups like Amnesty International, that "In general, victims of human rights abuses in the state have been unable to secure justice, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor" is divorced from reality. If these figures are inadequate to reinforce the army's respect for human rights, then the conduct of operation at Pampore, will clearly illustrate the cost of adherence to these values that the army pays on a daily basis in the pursuit of its responsibility.

This article was originally published in Daily O

• Vivek Chadha |
• 2016 |
• Book

• S. D. Muni, Vivek Chadha |
• 2016 |
• Book

If the IS has been able to successfully recruit Indians for the war in Syria and provide technical support for their travel, it is a matter of time before they find recruits willing to employ violence in India itself.

• Vivek Chadha |
• December 10, 2015 |
• Policy Brief

Research Fellow, IDSA, Col Vivek Chadha’s article on terrorism was published in Dainik Jagran on November 22, 2015.

Read complete article [+]

Speaking at the G-20 meeting in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack in Paris, Prime Minister Modi outlined a ten point plan. The very first issued underlined by him was the need to "curb and criminalise terror financing". Just two days later, he yet again reinforced the need for economic sanctions to curb the financing of terrorism from criminal activities. This raises some pertinent questions. Why is the finance of terrorism important? Why does this threat need to be reinforced? And finally, why have we not been able to stop it?

Financing of terrorism has been referred to as the lifeblood of terrorism. Taking this analogy further, one could say that if ideology is the soul of terrorism, finance is its lifeblood. One has to only look at some of the most potent terrorist organisations of recent years like the Islamic State (IS) and Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), to reinforce this reality. Both groups have succeeded in making a transnational impact beyond their immediate shores. The groups believe in the ideology of reprehensible violence and exploit and misinterpret religion to support their actions. Both terrorist organisations are also well organised, armed and led, with spectacular strikes having become their vicious calling card.

However, one of the most important factors, which reinforces their similarity, is the access to a very substantial funding, that is able to sustain their terrorist agenda. The reason finance is considered the lifeblood of terrorism, is its capacity to sustain an organisation as mammoth as the IS, which by some estimates is over a million dollars a day! Unlike popular perception, this funding is not as critical for actual terror strikes, as it is for sustaining an organisation that propagates the ideology of terror, recruits believers, pays for their sustenance, weapons, warlike material, travel and next of kin, after the death of terrorists.

In comparison, a terrorist organisation can be compared with a corporate body, which undertakes a large number of background activities in order to finally create a product which is introduced into the market. The cost of the product is not merely its market price, but the cumulative cost of its development. Just like a car company cannot produce new cars unless it can fund the life cycle cost of its product, a terrorist group will not be able to carryout strikes, unless it can generate funds for running the organisation.

There are different ways in which terrorist groups raise funds to support their activities.

In simple terms, the source of funding can be either external or internal to their base or location. It is rare for a terrorist group to physically control a geographical area and not only extract funds from it, but also administer it. The IS is one such example, which is why most of its funding remains internal. It has succeeded in extracting oil from both Iraq and Syria, tax the local people and businesses, employ kidnapping for ransom as a ploy, loot banks, sell antiquities, seek funding from supporters outside the region in the name of religion and the so called caliphate. The irony of the situation is their ability to sell oil at concessional rates, through and to neighbouring countries like Turkey, which are also fighting them on the battlefield. Both parties thus become beneficiaries of the economy of terror, having successfully quarantined their ideological differences for economic interests.

The LeT has an equally stable funding system in place, even if it is not as flush with funds as the IS. The group has successfully sold the idea of a jihad against countries like the US and India, to seek funds both from within and outside Pakistan. It has employed its front, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in the garb of a charity and welfare organisation to support its operations. The group has employed ingenious means like selling animal skins during Eid to raise funding, besides benefitting from zakat, a voluntary donation, which is collected at a rate of two and a half per cent of an individual's income, to support jihad. Most importantly, the LeT receives its financial muscle from the ISI, which funds it and coordinates its terror action plan.

The need to reinforce these realities stems from the fact that funding of such groups is no longer limited to the local confines of their area of sustenance. Terror groups, much like corporate bodies have well and truly embraced and exploited the benefits of globalisation. If the recent Paris attacks had their origins in Syria, planning in Belgium and execution in France, globalised terrorism is a phenomenon that is in full bloom. Much like the globalised operations of these terror groups, their funding too benefits from the tools of modernisation.

From legal banking channels to money transfer service scheme (MTSS) and fake Indian currency notes (FICN), printed inside Pakistan (as related to LeT) to hawala, every possible method of transit has been exploited by terrorist groups. Most of these transfers take place in a globalised, networked world, linking a large number of countries in a financial web.

Finally, if the sources and methods of transferring funds is so well known, why are we not able to stop it? The transfer of money is much like the flow of water. It tends to take the easiest available method to meander its way to its final destination. Again, just like water, which may change its course, direction and volume of flow, to eventually fill a reservoir, terror funding also follows this example. For terrorist groups, the channels employed are not as important, as the ability to ensure that funding remains consistent with their requirement.

Take the LeT for example. It began by openly collecting funds for its so called jihad against India. After being declared a terrorist organisation, JuD took on this role, circumventing international pressure. When the JuD also comes under pressure, the Pakistani state was always there, to fill its coffers and make sure that the "strategic asset" could be maintained at optimum efficiency. Similarly, the LeT has in the past moved money through every possible channel available. Whenever it finds strict norms being placed on cash or FICN smuggling, greater reliance is placed on hawala or through overvalued/ undervalued trade transactions.

Given the nature of sources and methods for moving funds, along with the backdrop of globalised instruments, which could well emanate far from the soil of an incorrigible Pakistan or an undermined Syria, the challenge to stop funding continues to affect counter terrorism initiatives. Combine this with the fragmented international resolve, wherein countries and blocs find it more convenient to pursue their parochial interests, the fight against the finance of terrorism remains a cherished ideal, yet a distant dream. Despite acknowledging the complicity of countries like Pakistan in funding terrorism and the US designating Hafiz Saeed as a terrorist, Pakistan remains a frontline ally in the war against terrorism.

The irony of this reality and the contradiction of competing interests, ensures that the globalised threat from terrorism is faced by a piecemeal and stunted response. While India has taken a number of steps to fight the contagion of the finance of terrorism, final victory is likely to elude agencies in the absence of much needed unity of approach at the international level.

This article was originally published in Daily O

• S. D. Muni, Vivek Chadha |
• 2014 |
• Book

• Vivek Chadha |
• 2015 |
• Book

The article analyses military change in the context of the Indian Army, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. In doing so, it analyses two case studies: restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian War of 1962; and mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. On the basis of these case studies, the article assesses the drivers and desirables for organisational change in the Indian Army, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which are especially apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the army.

• Vivek Chadha |
• October 2015 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

India has often been accused of not having a strategic culture and, more recently, of not clearly enunciating its strategic and doctrinal thought. More often than not, this has led to interpolation of brief statements, actions and speeches in public domain that create more doubts than answer questions regarding the country’s strategic formulations. Ali Ahmed attempts to dig deeper into India’s doctrinal underpinnings in light of nuclearization in the operational domain, a field that remains limited to patchy assessments in the past.

• Vivek Chadha |
• April 2015 |
• Journal of Defence Studies