Vivek Chadha

Research Fellow, IDSA, Col Vivek Chadha’s article on the ongoing raids on the Hurriyat and its linked organisations, titled ‘Hurriyat, hawala raids are a body blow to terror funding network in Kashmir’ was published in ‘Daily O’ on June 6, 2017.

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Nuclearisation of the Indian subcontinent limits conventional military options available to India for punishing Pakistan’s employment of terrorism as a tool of state policy. While India has rightly balanced the use of diplomatic and limited military means over a period of time, even as these remain relevant, the option of economic sanctions deserves deeper analysis for its efficacy and impact. Economic measures can be undertaken both in the form of direct and indirect actions against a target country, individual or an organisation with varied degrees of impact.

• Vivek Chadha |
• April 2017 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The Indian Army has undertaken sub-conventional operations, especially counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism for over 60 years. During this period, there has been an evolutionary shift in its approach to such operations.

• Vivek Chadha |
• 2016 |
• Occasional Papers

The antidote to fidayeen attacks is a well-trained and informed soldier, who is clinical in his task of neutralising the threat as and when it arises.

• Vivek Chadha |
• December 15, 2016 |
• Policy Brief

Demonetisation is an important step in the fight against the finance of terrorism. However, it should neither be the first nor the last, if the interlinked threats of corruption, crime and the finance of terrorism have to be controlled.

• Vivek Chadha |
• November 18, 2016 |
• Policy Brief

Research Fellow, IDSA, Col Vivek Chadha’s commentary on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent currency revamp, titled ‘What scrapping Rs 500/1,000 notes means for countering terrorism’, was published in ‘Daily O’ on November 9, 2016.

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India’s diplomatic offensive launched post the Uri-attacks provided the broader context in which its decision to carry out the surgical strike needs to be seen.

• Vivek Chadha, Rumel Dahiya, Neha Kohli, Shruti Pandalai |
• October 04, 2016 |
• Issue Brief

The events of the last week have been interpreted by some as the failure of the State to reach out to the separatist elements in Kashmir. On the face of it, this does seem to be the reality of the situation. However, a more deliberate analysis of the situation reveals an entirely different picture, which is far more disturbing for the forces of moderation.

The two visits undertaken by the Union home minister, with the second one having been as part of an all-party delegation, was an attempt at outreach to all segments of the society. While some sections did come out and interact, with a view to resolving the disturbing situation, as well as the long-term challenge, others like the Hurriyat, refused to to do so, shutting their doors on a unilateral and well-intentioned attempt at reconciliation.

If one were to relate this refusal to interact on part of the Hurriyat to the meetings that took place in 2010 under similar circumstances, which did lead to peace and reconciliation, the change in attitude can be attributed to three distinct factors, which seem to be driving their stubborn approach.

First, unlike last time, when the Hurriyat had greater control over the crowds, this time around, despite the brave face on display, the Hurriyat’s influence over the common man has receded. There is a feeling amongst certain hardline sections of the population that the Hurriyat has failed to lead them towards declared goals and objectives.

Therefore, even if they were to appeal for calm and stop protests, it is unlikely that the agitators would heed to such calls. The option that remains with the Hurriyat is either face the anger of their radical base, or ride the wave of protests.

The Hurriyat seems to have chosen the latter option. They have calculated the potential gains of emerging stronger after the crisis, since they visualise their emergence as the only separatist organisation, which will have the right to negotiate any future settlement with the government.

This might just work in the short-term. However, the long-term threat that emerges as a result of the same, has been lost sight of. And to understand that, the history of the separatist movement in Kashmir has lessons that must not be forgotten.

The first group of people who were hounded out of Kashmir were the Kashmiri Pandits. The selective killing of some and the fear psychosis that followed it, led to their mass exodus. This happened at the behest of a conniving Pakistan and freshly radicalised youth from the state.

The second wave of radical thought and rejection of moderation yet again sweeps the Valley. The target of radicalisation is not merely the Indian State, as may be seen on the streets of Kashmir. It is the voice of reason and moderation.

This voice of moderation does not only belong to the political leaders. It also represents parents who do not want their children’s future to be shrouded in darkness. It echoes in the calls for restraint.

This time around, the wrath of frenzy will not be borne by the Kashmiri Pandits. It has already started affecting the moderate Muslim families. It is these people who will look to escape the mindless violence and aimless stalling of state institutions. The common people who resented the checking of their vehicles by security forces, are facing the reality of young children stopping the same buses to frisk them for their "enemies".

This had led to some Muslims leaving Kashmir to seek normalcy beyond the state. This trickle emanates from moderate Muslims, who want their children to go to schools. It represents people who do not want the virus of radical thought to take their children on a path that will push them towards the same end as the one chosen by Burhan Wani.

It is this misdirection that the Hurriyat has indirectly encouraged in a bid to retain their relevance amongst their supporters. They have chosen the easier wrong that is reflected in the rejection of moderation to cement their position amongst their supporters and controllers across the LoC.

However, in doing so, they will continue to cede ground to rational moderate voices in Kashmir Valley, who want their normal lives back and along with it their self respect and honour.

The Hurriyat, through their stubborn and short-sighted approach has lost the faith of these moderates, who remain a vast majority in the state.

On the other hand, the radicalised youth can also see through the Hurriyat’s self-seeking ways, having been witness to their children having settled outside the state in comfortable and safe environs, even as they continue to call for others to sacrifice their lives. Thus, in the long term, the Hurriyat will not only become irrelevant for the moderates, but also the hardline youth.

Second, the Hurriyat by continuing on the path towards violence is contributing immensely to the radicalisation of Kashmiri society. Kashmiriyat, a term that is increasing being used by moderate voices today, does not merely represent the ethos of the society. It is both the shield against radical Islam and the glue, which bound different sections of Kashmiri society together.

Hurriyat’s adventurism threatens to loosen the bonds that Kashmiriyat represented. In doing so, they are unleashing the very monster that Pakistan attempted to create to contest India’s emergence, only to see it feed upon their own society.

The chimera of azadi, that is being shown to the people, is merely a tool to retain and regain power and influence. Ironically, it is a replica of Pakistan Army’s illusion of contesting India wanting to dismember Pakistan, that is sold to the population of the country in a bid to retain power.

Lastly, the Hurriyat, along with Pakistan, have underestimated the anger and disillusionment of the world at large with the employment of terrorism as an instrument of politics. It is for this reason that the diplomatic frenzy witnessed in Islamabad and Srinagar to internationalise the issue has been deflated in the face of global scrutiny.

The support of Pakistan that Syed Ali Shah Geelani uses as an anvil, is as credible as Pakistan’s own human rights record in Balochistan and PoK. This is all the more relevant, given their role in pushing small children in harm’s way in the Valley.

Pakistan has already succeeded in radicalising segments of Afghan society through their involvement there. It is surprising that sections within the Hurriyat are allowing them to play a similar role in Kashmir for their short-term gains.

It is often easier to choose the easier wrong in the face of the more difficult right. Kashmir is at the crossroads. The path being followed by the Hurriyat is likely to erode the moderate ethos of Kashmiri society, even as it will not get them the power they yearn for.

On the other hand, the option to contest what they see as injustice through dialogue, not only has better chances of success, but is also accompanied by strengthening of democratic values and traditions.

This, then, is truly the path of Kashmiriyat, Insaniyat and Jamooriyat that the Hurriyat must adopt, even it is for their parochial interest.

The article was originally published in DailyO.

The killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, yet again, exposed the fragile peace prevalent in the Kashmir Valley.

A number of attempts have been made to analyse the emotional bursting of the dam that led to the outpouring of anger and frustration.

This article does not attempt to rationalise the incidents, as, some of the past attempts seem to have become a victim of their logic. Instead, this is a modest effort at suggesting the way forward from the crossroads that the state finds itself at.

The article suggests ten steps that need to be initiated, to not only recover from the tragic events of the past week, but also take a substantive stride forward with an aim of breaking the existing cycle of violence.

This is based on the understanding that the events succeeding the death of Burhan Wani are not merely a consequence of the incident, but the manifestation of a larger issue that reflects a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo in Kashmir.

The current incident was possibly a trigger that galvanised the people and also gave an opportunity to inimical forces in Pakistan to exploit these conditions.

1. Every attempt must be made to arrest the ongoing violence, through direct communication and outreach by political representatives, community leaders and village elders.

No major initiatives can be attempted under existing conditions, which continue to witness loss of lives.

2. Every effort must be made to provide immediate medical aid to security personnel and locals who could well be saved from either death or permanent disability, as a result of expeditious action.

3. A senior all-party delegation must visit the state, with representatives of all major parties of the central and state government.

They must seek a broad-based assessment of the situation, which must become the basis for any future steps initiated to address the existing problems.

4. Constitute a high-level political committee, as a representative of the central and state governments to undertake a two-fold responsibility.

One, analyse reports of past committees and distil the essence of their recommendations.

Two, meet all stakeholders in the state and suggest psychological, political, social, economic and security measures within a time frame of four months.

The recommendations must be made public, with an aim of broad-based discussions over a period of three months in order to seek views of the society at large, including the local population of the state.

5. The government must open channels of communication with all sections of the people within the state to discuss options for implementation of these recommendations.

This must include political parties, separatists, students, religious leaders and eminent members of the society.

6. The implementation of these recommendations must be undertaken in a time bound manner, with high priority to disbursement of financial assistance earmarked for flood relief.

7. Existing proposals which involve allocation of land for welfare projects must be deferred until the committee submits its report in consultation with the local representatives.

Also read: India will face more Burhan Wanis if it keeps ignoring Kashmir's voice

8. Existing Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with law and order situations and crowd control must be revisited for ensuring that casualties can be minimised during mass protests.

9. Measures must be strengthened to neutralise Pakistan’s attempts at interfering, instigating and exploiting local conditions, as also continuing with its proxy war in the state and beyond, through local, national and international initiatives.

The recent past has already witnessed Pakistan increasingly being questioned internationally regarding its duplicity in the fight against terrorism. This effort needs to be further augmented.

10. Extremist perceptions often get cemented when timely and judicious messaging does not emanate at the appropriate time.

At times when mob frenzy dictates thinking rather than rationality, a sane message of hope can soothe real and a perceived sense of hurt.

This is a process that cannot happen overnight, but, must nevertheless be undertaken in the right earnest.

The most important element of this initiative must focus upon the youth of the state, who have been affected the most during the two-decade old conflict.

These recommendations are neither all encompassing, nor final.

However, they represent an attempt at moving beyond the ongoing blame game to look forward rather than backwards in the hope that a solution to existing problems in the Valley can and must be found in our lifetime.

The article was originally published in the DailyO.

The recent past has witnessed China take a position on more issues than one in direct conflict with India's national interest. To name just two of these, it blocked the intended ban against Jaish-i-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar at a UN Committee on the eve of April Fool's day in 2016. This was a repeat of an earlier attempt by India to ensure action against Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi of Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2015.

More recently, China has indicated its reservations regarding India's candidature for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a body that contributes to nuclear non-proliferation. Purportedly, China assigns its position to India not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which India has clearly indicated as "discriminatory". In reality, it wants Pakistan to slip through the opening created for India, despite their blatant nuclear proliferation record.

These actions would seem inexplicable for a country like China, which is on the cusp of achieving great power status and a potential challenger to the US. Its insistence on remaining astride a lame horse goes against the grain of rational world opinion, which evidently and justifiably visualises Pakistan as not only the foremost jehadi factory of the world, but also a nuclear proliferator. Why then would China not only bail out Pakistan from a difficult position, but also support an embarrassingly lost cause?

China's actions must be seen from the perspective of a country which unlike other major powers is not blessed with a large number of allies and friends. It appreciates Pakistan for having stood by its side during years of isolation. This continues to drive Chinese gratitude for an ally that Pakistan has proved to be over the years.

Pakistan has also been bending backwards to facilitate Beijing's quest to achieve energy security through the Gwadar link in vicinity of the oil and gas markets of West Asia. This has further been strengthened through the road link that connects the two countries, providing China with critical connectivity into its relatively underdeveloped regions. In return Pakistan receives Chinese investments and military support, which is increasingly becoming the mainstay of its military capability aimed at India.

On the face of it, the relationship seems to be sailing the tranquil waters of mutual interest. However, a closer look will highlight certain misgivings emerging from China regarding the nature of relationship being pursued with Pakistan, especially given the self-destructive path that the country seems to have chartered.

First, terrorism which is being employed by Pakistan as state policy to contain India suits China as well. It keeps India busy fighting a slow bleed conflict with Pakistan, even as its threshold remains below the potential red lines drawn by India. However, Pakistan's policy of employing terrorism as a strategic weapon in Afghanistan is affecting China's commercial interests, where it has not been able to pursue its mining agenda and is threatened by export of terrorists into its weak underbelly of Xinjiang.

Similarly, the proliferation of these groups within Pakistan has endangered the safety and security of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along with the $46 billion investment. Worse still, once China does make a substantial investment in Pakistan, it would have to further spend its already strained resources to protect its initial economic forays, an option it can ill afford at this juncture marked by a weakening economy. This could well give a body blow to its foremost initiative of One Belt One Road (OBOR) unveiled by Xi Jinping.

Second, a famous idiom states that a "man is known by the company he keeps". This is equally true for nations. Major powers even like the US cannot pursue their strategic agenda without partner countries and allies, as has repeatedly been emphasised by senior leaders from the country. The arraignment of partner countries in respect of the two major powers in the Indo-Pacific reflects on the quality of their alignments.

In case of the US, this includes Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Philippines and increasingly India, though as a partner country. On the other hand, China is accompanied by the weight of Pakistan's failing status, record of using terrorism as state policy and nuclear proliferation history. This is hardly the kind of counterweight that a major power contender would want in its quest for seeking parity with the US.

These factors are starting to impact China's approach towards Pakistan. And in doing so, first, it is attempting to follow a more independent policy towards Afghanistan, rather than hanging on to Pakistan's coat tails. Second, its not so subtle hint with relation to terrorism was indicated by the state run television channel CCTV 9 airing the 26/11 documentary clearly nailing the role of LeT. For a country which speaks as much through discrete actions as through words, the writing is on the wall.

While it may still be early days to expect any major change in China's policy towards Pakistan, there is evidently a hint of shifting stance that seems to be accompanying its actions. A relationship that was once described as "sweeter than honey", seems to have been affected by just a tinge of sour taste. It is hoped that actions on the eve of April Fool's day that led to giving terrorism emanating from Pakistan a new lease of life, will be guided by more mature decision making in future, as will the decision to limit India's role in multilateral institutions.

The article was originally published in the Daily O