India

Reflections on the Kargil War

The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'

A Cold Start: India’s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict

A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a military confrontation following the revelation of Pakistan's complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Islamabad's recalcitrance in taking action against groups responsible for this attack forced New Delhi to plan punitive responses against terror camps within Pakistan, prompting the latter to mobilize troops and project a capability to repulse an Indian attack.

Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary

Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)

India and Kuwait: New Hopes and Aspirations

The recent three day visit of Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari to Kuwait fills a three decade diplomatic gap between the two countries. The visit was highly successful to the extent that besides interactions in the fields of science and technology, education and emphasizing the relevance of cultural exchanges, it brought international terrorism within the ambit of bilateral discussions.

Exit Points and the Updation of Cold Start Doctrine

The Army Commander’s conference is a much looked forward to biannual feature in the strategic calendar. The occasion, and like conferences in the other two services, is used by the forces, among other things, to sensitise the nation as to their preparedness and important decisions taken and measures underway. In April 2004, a major initiative of the Army was communicated, that of adoption by the Army of the Cold Start doctrine.

Injecting New Dynamism in US-Australia Ties

Labour Party Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, has been in office for nearly one and a half years after his unexpected victory over John Howard in late 2007. For almost three decades after World War II, Australia systematically repudiated the idea of being identified as an Asian country, until the resource boom in the early 1970s that catapulted Australia as one of the major resource exporters to resource-importing countries such as Japan and now China. Since then, Australia’s external orientation has undergone a profound change.

Complicity of State Actors in Chittagong Arms Haul Case Revealed

India’s position stands vindicated. It had for long maintained that not only have insurgents from the north east found safe havens in Bangladeshi soil but that they have enjoyed the backing of the Bangladeshi state as well. These allegations have now been proven with the confessional statement of Md. Hafizur Rahman and Din Mohammad, the two accused in the Chittagong arms haul case. This was the largest arms haul in Bangladesh, which had taken place on April 2, 2004 in the Chittagong area.