India

The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

• Ali Ahmed
• April 2010
• Journal of Defence Studies

Modern Nation States show striking proclivity in establishing a hierarchy of objectives. Among others, the pursuit of security is placed as a primary objective without which other goals remain vulnerable.… Continue reading Terror Without Tags: Need For A Comprehensive National Security Policy

• S Sasikumar
• April-June 2010
• CBW Magazine

The US Nuclear Posture Review The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)1 is a policy document of the US Department of Defense that underlines the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s… Continue reading De-linking CBW from Nuclear Deterrence

• P K Sundaram
• April-June 2010
• CBW Magazine

The defence minister is indeed correct that ‘sacrifices’ would have to be made but this time India should offer that privilege to the Pakistani Army.

• Ramesh Phadke
• April 05, 2010
• IDSA Comments

Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve, an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant.

• Raj Shukla
• April 02, 2010
• IDSA Comments

The Indian armed forces appear to be driving defence budgets rather than a cold calculation of the country’s desire for ‘adequate’ military capability.

• Ramesh Phadke
• March 30, 2010
• IDSA Comments

While China has shown eagerness for the Dalai Lama’s return to China, it has categorically refused to take back the exiled Tibetan population based in India.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• March 25, 2010
• IDSA Comments

If Pakistan succumbs to American pressure, it will continue to be engaged in a long war of attrition on its western borders. If Pakistan resists American pressure, it will be isolated in the world and the international community will have to fall back upon India to put a firewall around the AfPak region.

• Sushant Sareen
• March 08, 2010
• IDSA Comments

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

• Ali Ahmed
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

India's nuclear development has been accompanied by a dual track strategy of developing and building weapons while criticising the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory and simultaneously making public statements and proposals in favour of nuclear disarmament. But with international progress likely on aspects of nuclear disarmament over the next few months, India will be in the spotlight at the forthcoming 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to help move the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward.

• Leonard Weiss
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis