India-Pakistan Relations

The ceasefire decision was influenced by the combination of three factors: absence of the prospect of a swift victory, concerns about Chinese military intervention, and concerted diplomatic pressure from major powers.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• September 21, 2015
• Special Feature

It was not in Pakistan’s interest that the NSA meeting should take place. It is to their credit that they managed to do that by waving a red flag at the Indians through their first briefing on the planned NSA talks by mentioning their invitation to the Hurriyat leaders for a meeting in Delhi prior to the NSA talks.

• G. Balachandran
• August 28, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The new equation is that the Americans nudge India, the Chinese press Pakistan, and together they try to ensure that things don’t go out of control in South Asia.

• Sushant Sareen
• July 20, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The thumb rule in making a policy U-turn is “minimise damage or maximise advantage”. What is extraordinary about the Modi government’s U-turn is that it maximises losses and minimises advantages.

• Sushant Sareen
• February 26, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The time has perhaps come to restructure, even partition, SAARC to make it more effective. This is something that might also be required to be done in the likely event that Pakistan fosters the Taliban in Afghanistan.

• Sushant Sareen
• November 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The Wagah incident is not going to wake-up Pakistan to the existential threat posed by jihadist terror groups. There is neither going to be any change in its attitude towards using terrorism as an instrument of state policy, nor its inimical attitude towards India.

• Sushant Sareen
• November 05, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The recent heavy firing by the Pakistani army is to gain public sympathy and providing it greater flexibility in the flawed civil-military relations. It is an orchestrated plan to provoke India believing that it can take such a risk of escalation in the back drop of its effective nuclear capability.

• Arun Sahgal
• October 10, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In the short-term India needs to let the internal situation within Pakistan play itself out and see what emerges from the standoff. There is no doubt that Pakistan will have to be engaged but terms and manner will be dictated by the prevailing political and economic scenario in India, Afghanistan and the region including India-China relations.

• Arun Sahgal
• August 22, 2014
• IDSA Comments

• Satish Chandra , Arvind Gupta
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

On November 5, 2013 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Hatf-IX (Nasr) short range battlefield ‘nuclear’ missile. To date there have been four flight tests of the missile system. After the first three tests (April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013) Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had put out identical press releases.1 These statements claimed that the missile had a range of 60 km and carried ‘nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield’.

• Arun Vishwanathan
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis