India-Pakistan Relations

There is a need to conclusively revisit the issue of India’s response, and other pro-active measures, to deter and forestall terrorist attacks in future.

• P. K. Upadhyay
• July 15, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Pakistan’s conciliatory approach towards India is tactical and could change rapidly if the army decides that its interests are better served through a more offensive posture.

• Sushant Sareen
• July 13, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Ever since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Western media reports have constantly highlighted the dramatic increase in Pakistan's production of nuclear fissile materials and nuclear warheads. Reports published at end of January in the New York Times and the Washington Post are a case in point. These reports, quoting serving and retired US administration officials, mentioned that the latest US intelligence assessments have concluded that Pakistan has been steadily expanding its nuclear arsenal – particularly since President Obama took office in 2009.

• G. Balachandran , Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• July 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The success of high-level talks between India and Pakistan would depend on how the media shape popular opinion in the two countries and popular support to take the relationship forward.

• Shamshad A. Khan
• June 29, 2011
• IDSA Comments

The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.

• Ali Ahmed
• May 12, 2011
• IDSA Comments

The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.

• Sumita Kumar
• May 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The article reviews the Cold Start doctrine in light of the limited war doctrine. It argues that the launch of strike corps entails a risk prone war expansion. War termination should therefore be short of the launch of strike corps offensives. It suggests a 'Cold Start and Stop' strategy with limited offensives by integrated battle groups being used to coerce Pakistan. Pakistani amenability to Indian war aims would be dependent on India offering incentives diplomatically alongside. India's limited war doctrine, currently not articulated, must be informed by such a war waging strategy.

• Ali Ahmed
• May 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The aversion in India to dealing directly with Pakistan's military establishment is entirely understandable, but is also unreal given the power dynamics of Pakistani politics.

• Sushant Sareen
• April 26, 2011
• IDSA Comments

As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India’s response to terror will have to be well thought out.

• Dhruv C Katoch
• April 2011
• Journal of Defence Studies

In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.

• Ali Ahmed
• April 24, 2011
• IDSA Comments