India-China War

How have commentators perceived India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962? What were its underlying reasons? Can the entire blame be cast on China for its surprise attack? Or, were India’s thoughtless actions also responsible? After touching on these questions, this article describes the defence reforms undertaken by India after the border conflict in 1962 in the light of the shortcomings and deficiencies highlighted.

• P. R. Chari
• October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

While recalling the 1962 conflict we often refer to India’s ‘humiliating defeat’ at Chinese hands and forget that the Jawan of the Indian Army invariably fought with exceptional bravery and valour in the most trying conditions often without winter clothing and in some cases even without adequate ammunition.

• Ramesh Phadke
• November 18, 2009
• IDSA Comments

The paper examines the utilisation of air power in the 1962 India-China war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict. The study reveals a certain continuity in the attitudes to the use of offensive air power in limited conflicts. Both in 1962 and in 1999, the use of air power was hedged about with various restrictions. Underlying these appears to be the belief that the use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory. Hence there is a hesitation to commit offensive air power assets.

• R. Sukumaran
• July 2003
• Strategic Analysis