India-China Relations

The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• November 15, 2013
• Issue Brief

• S. D. Muni , Vivek Chadha
• Book

It is well established that the armed ethnic groups in Myanmar act as the interlocking chain for the illegal weapons flow from Yunnan in China via Myanmar to the Northeast India. Reports indicate that the most effective illegal weapons trader in Myanmar is the armed ethnic group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

• Namrata Goswami
• November 07, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The new architecture admittedly is a rehash of previously signed (1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012) de-escalatory measures. Most of the Clauses outline mechanisms for exchanging information, consultations about military activities and enhancing communications between border personnel and headquarters.

• P. Stobdan
• October 29, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Chinese would be very aware that India heads to general elections in seven months time. They would have taken cognizance of various ‘surveys’ as well as soundings of the political scene that would indicate that it is entirely possible that there would be a change of government following the elections.

• R. S. Kalha
• October 25, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Joint military exercises hold strategic relevance but India must consider seriously that despite the Annual Defence Dialogue mechanism and joint training exercises, incursions in the border regions have increased over the years.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 02, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Two recent events exemplify India’s geopolitical dilemma. In early April 2013, it was reported that Chinese submarines had been conducting forays in the Indian Ocean that were apparently picked up by US Navy sonar.1 A few weeks later, there was a Chinese intrusion in the western sector where a platoon of Chinese troops entered the Depsang Valley area of eastern Ladakh.2 While the status quo ante was peacefully attained, the Ladakh incident is a vivid reminder of the abiding implications of an unresolved Himalayan dispute.

• Zorawar Daulet Singh
• July 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

The intrusion by the Chinese Army in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was first reported by the media on 15 April 2013. Initial reports indicated that about 30–40 armed soldiers of the Chinese Army had set up three to four tents in the area of Depsang Bulge, south east of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). Subsequently, media reports indicated that the Government had accepted this intrusion to be 19 km from the LAC, inside Indian territory.

• Mandip Singh
• July 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

The article seeks to assess the evolution of the Tibet question against the backdrop of the problems associated with the succession of the Dalai Lama. It also discusses the implications of all this for India and provides policy recommendations the Indian authorities could use to deal with this situation.

• Adrien Frossard
• July 2013
• Strategic Analysis

The Chinese prime minister’s visit was in no way intended to offer solution to the vexed issue of border incursion. Li came to pursue China’s national interest and not to enrich India-China bilateral ties.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• May 31, 2013
• IDSA Comments