Rebooting the Defence Budget
There is a strong case for abandoning the present approach of looking at the defence budget through the narrow prism of allocation and utilisation, and instead focus on outcomes.
- Amit Cowshish
- February 28, 2017
There is a strong case for abandoning the present approach of looking at the defence budget through the narrow prism of allocation and utilisation, and instead focus on outcomes.
The objective of asking these question should be to elicit information that generates a well-informed debate on, and facilitates the result-oriented monitoring of, the MoD’s handling of matters related to the defence budget.
The share of defence expenditure in 2016-17 has gone below the levels it was in 1955-56. In 2017-18 it will go down to 1.557 per cent of GDP.
There is a plethora of evidence to show that the problem of establishing a Defence Modernisation Fund does not lie with any ‘rules of business’, but instead with its merit and workability.
While certain changes in the format of the defence Demand for Grants have brought even more complexity to the task of estimating India’s official defence budget, the fact remains that there has only been a meagre increase of 5 per cent which is grossly inadequate to keep the Armed Forces in fighting form.
Budget is not just all about figures but also a statement of policy. The Defence Budget for 2017-18 contains no hint of any intention of the government to bring about a paradigm shift in the defence policy.
If the defence expenditure relationship to the GDP of 1.65 per cent is maintained, we may see a budget estimate (BE) for defence expenditure of Rs. 285,000 crores, against the current year BE of Rs. 249,099 crores.
There is a need to go beyond stale issues and have a more meaningful and dispassionate discussion on how to make the best use of the allocations made for defence.
The past decade, and in particular the Twelfth Plan period, have been challenging times for the Indian defence budget. Strategic foresight demands that India’s military strength and capabilities relate to diverse challenges by way of a not unlikely two-front war, the attendant imperatives for a ‘Cold Start’ capability, non-conventional challenges from non-state actors, counter-terrorism capabilities and unavoidable internal security responsibilities.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.