China

• S. D. Muni , Vivek Chadha
• Book

The Arctic is beginning to test the stage-managed optics of China and Russia’s ‘strategic partnership’. Friction was most recently on display after the Arctic Council’s May 2013 decision to confer permanent observer status on Beijing. The Chinese media celebrated the move as an affirmation of the nation’s ‘legitimate rights’ in Arctic affairs.1 Russian officials were much less enthusiastic.

• Lincoln E. Flake
• November 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Clubbing the visits to Russia and China is a smart move. But the prime minister will also need to indulge in smart diplomacy to deal with a number of ticklish issues and will have to convince his counterparts that Indian foreign policy is independent and follows national interests.

• Arvind Gupta
• October 21, 2013
• IDSA Comments

For the past decade, China is known to have actively used ‘three warfares’ (3Ws) strategy—media, psychological and legal warfare—to weaken its adversaries in regions constituting what it perceives to be its ‘core interests’. While a wide range of tools have been deployed, the attacks have remained mostly confined to Taiwan and South-East Asian states involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But with Beijing’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) growing, there is evidence emerging of the 3Ws strategy being put to use against India.

• Abhijit Singh
• October 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

In the first round of promotions to the senior-most ranks of PLA, Xi Jinping signals building a younger, technological savvy military that needs to be honest and under the control to the party.

• Bijoy Das
• September 25, 2013
• IDSA Comments

This policy brief discusses some of the key trends in the Asia Pacific and sets out a long-term approach for India so as to maximise its security and developmental opportunities.

• Arvind Gupta
• September 19, 2013
• Policy Brief

Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.

• Post Bahadur Basnet
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:

• Arvind Gupta
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis