The importance of the road network in the north-east needs no emphasis. India is now raising the 17 Mountain Corps to augment its strategic strike capability vis-à-vis China. The BRO is the key instrument to realise the road network objective and provide the required logistical capability to this Corps.

2013 witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years, accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties. Some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of its role and responsibility are better understood.

The State hardly has any `balance from its current revenues` to take on additional internal security expenditure or fund its own development activities. In this backdrop, the State has perforce to depend on the Centre to maintain a security establishment and sustain it on a long-term basis.

Five years since the Mumbai terror attacks, the coastal mechanism remains weak. It is time to seriously consider the Indian coast guard as the single authority responsible for coastal security and accordingly amend the charter of the ICG.

In addition to building a 10-km fence along its border with Myanmar, India should strengthen the security of the border by deploying adequate guarding forces, revise the FMR and constructively engage with Myanmar to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents and traffickers.

It is well established that the armed ethnic groups in Myanmar act as the interlocking chain for the illegal weapons flow from Yunnan in China via Myanmar to the Northeast India. Reports indicate that the most effective illegal weapons trader in Myanmar is the armed ethnic group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).