India’s security strategy for the economic corridors and connectivity will have to entail water tight anti-drugs control measures and mechanisms to snuff out the possibilities of surges in narcotics trafficking that may result from better connectivity and established networks of peoples across the region.

To reshape public confidence further, the Union Home Ministry should quickly address the long festering issue of redeploying at least one regiment of the sashastra seema bal (SSB) in Ladakh. Initially raised as Special Service Bureau in the 1960s, SSB effectively involved natives for building a second line of defence against adversaries.

The CPI (Maoist) is fully aware that a movement of this magnitude cannot sustain on its own for long without any external support; be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge or ideological support. Given India’s geopolitical location, it would come as no surprise if the CPI (Maoist), through its aggressive efforts, is able to garner substantive resources for its disposal.

Compared to the worst Maoists-affected state of Odisha, in the neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the level of violence has come down substantially. In the coming years, Malkangiri and other south-western border districts of Odisha will continue to bleed because of the Maoist quest for safe havens in these districts during hot pursuit by the Chhattisgarh police.

Foremost on the government’s defence and national security reforms agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review and must take the public into confidence.

The recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply unable to keep “extortion” networks in check. While the cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by the outfit render the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.

In a document entitled ‘Our Financial Policy’, the Maoists mention that they have three types of economic needs, viz. the needs of war, political propaganda and the people. To cater to these needs there are three broad categories of resources, viz. (a) membership fee, levy and contributions from the people; (b) confiscation of the wealth and income of the enemy; and (c) ‘revolutionary taxes’ collected in guerrilla zones and base areas.