MoD will have to make sure that no weapon system is purchased unless an arrangement is made for sustained supply of ammunition, not necessarily through the OFB.
It is time the MoD considered creating structures and organizations that are not an intrinsic part of the ministerial set up to implement the production and procurement policies once these are formulated by the ministry.
Three months after the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was swept to power at the centre in the general elections held in April–May 2014 to the 16th Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament), the Standing Committee on Defence was constituted under the chairmanship of Major General B.C. Khanduri (Retd.), former Chief Minister of the northern state of Uttarakhand and a prominent member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is the main constituent of the NDA.
MoD will do well to set up a crack team of experts from all fields to work out the terms of the proposed IGA keeping in view the larger picture of what happens after these 36 aircraft are inducted.
A loosely articulated idea of making India a defence manufacturing hub cannot work unless it is backed by a comprehensive blueprint, efficient procedures, meticulous implementation, trained and responsive manpower, continuous monitoring and quick decision-making.
There is an urgent need to conceptualise a policy framework as to what Make-in-India implies so far as defence production is concerned and how it is different from the existing policy framework.
If reports about the diversion of INR 13,000 crore from the capital segment of the defence budget to the revenue heads are true, it is an indication of the growing strain on the revenue budget.
The examination of the detailed demands for grant (DDGs) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) by the Standing Committee on Defence of the 14th Lok Sabha (2004–05 to 2008–09) and recommendations made by the committee had little impact on the country’s defence budget. While the examination was generally perfunctory, the recommendations were either too general or too impractical to be implemented by MoD. This is the second of two articles that examines how the Standing Committee on Defence of the 15th Lok Sabha (2009–10 to 2013–14) followed the same pattern.
It is difficult to visualise how the Russian offer to make LUH in India could be actualised unless the government invokes ‘strategic considerations’ for making it in India or signs an inter-governmental agreement for that purpose.
