Ali Ahmed

The robustness of India's nuclear doctrine would face a severe challenge in the case of conventional military offensives into Pakistan in a future Indo-Pak conflict. Such offensives are possible in case Pakistan's nuclear threshold is taken as high and its doctrine one of 'last resort'. However, Pakistani nuclear use options may include lower order nuclear use. In light of this, it recommends that India take a serious look at the Limited War concept as well as revise its nuclear doctrine to 'flexible nuclear retaliation'.

• Ali Ahmed |
• July 2010 |
• Strategic Analysis

Peacekeeping is India’s forte, not only because of its military’s professionalism but also due to its political acceptability globally. India’s image as a benign rising power can be exploited and enhanced in raising its peacekeeping profile.

• Ali Ahmed |
• June 07, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

Even though the respective military exercise held by Pakistan and India are about handling of respective offensive reserves, the message that emerges is that their employment is best avoided.

• Ali Ahmed |
• May 07, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

Nuclear exchanges in accord with targeting limitation would serve as powerful nuclear signaling to the other side in case of deterrence breakdown.

• Ali Ahmed |
• April 21, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

• Ali Ahmed |
• April 2010 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

While limitation in aims set is acknowledged as the primary way of conflict limitation, the point lost sight of usually on the politico-military facet is war termination.

• Ali Ahmed |
• March 29, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

• Ali Ahmed |
• March 2010 |
• Strategic Analysis

To prevent intelligence failures there is a need to incorporate the additional and fresh areas of intelligence interest brought on by the asymmetric and nuclear dimensions of future conflict.

• Ali Ahmed |
• February 26, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

The nuclear ‘backdrop’ carries dangers even in a single front let alone a ‘two front’ situation, particularly since a move to rescind the NFU tenet of doctrine may be necessary.

• Ali Ahmed |
• January 29, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments

The point of significance is that even as the Army prepares for the worst case, it would be a political-diplomatic-strategic exercise to ensure that such a scenario does not arise.

• Ali Ahmed |
• January 06, 2010 |
• IDSA Comments