Turkey, IS, US, Syria
There is a sudden and dramatic change in Turkey’s policy towards the Islamic State. What explains this change and what might be Turkey’s calculations?
- K. P. Fabian
- August 14, 2015
There is a sudden and dramatic change in Turkey’s policy towards the Islamic State. What explains this change and what might be Turkey’s calculations?
This article aims to delve into the patterns of convergence and divergence of interests among three key regional players in the Middle East: the Russian Federation, Turkey and Iran.
In the West, there is growing realisation that only boots on the ground can defeat or substantially destroy the Daesh. Unless a ground force capable of taking back the territories seized by the Daesh arrives on the scene, the advantage will lie with the jihadis.
Turkey’s natural gas reserves are 218 bcf and its production is roughly 27 bcf. It relies heavily on imports to meet its domestic demand. Additionally, Turkey positions itself as a gas transit hub – importing from Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran and re-exporting some of it to Europe.
In more than three decades, ever since the Islamic-oriented National Order Party was formed in 1969, Turkish politics has been analysed by many in terms of two straitjacketed views: Islamists trying to capture power on the one hand, and on the other hand the secularists or the state elite, with the help of the military, struggling to keep the country’s political orientation towards the West to protect Turkey as a secular state. This image of Turkey has created some confusion among strategic analysts abroad in understanding Turkey and its policies.
The US may have provided the support and platform for the apology, but it was something Israel had to do desperately as it was finding the developing regional situation difficult to handle with every passing day.
The Patriot deployments signify Turkey’s attempt to secure itself and its allies against touted missile threats from the two countries with which it shares borders to the east – Syria and Iran.
Turkey is realising that a soft power-based foreign policy was successful and gave returns with minimum risks only when the region was stable. With the Middle East going through a political transformation, Turkey will have to invent new strategies to remain relevant and continue its rise a regional power.
Iran, Israel and Turkey have adopted a two pronged approach to deal with the Arab Spring: avoid the negative consequences of the uprisings while at the same time deriving mileage to further their interests in an uncertain neighbourhood.
The Arab countries where people have successfully overthrown the dictatorial regimes now face the daunting task of moving forward with democratic processes, economic development and institution building.