A Rejoinder to John R. Schmidt, ‘Pakistan’s Alternate Universe’
Whatever John R. Schmidt’s aims, the arguments that he has employed do not stand the test of casual perusal leave alone scrutiny.
- Amit Julka
- December 12, 2011
Whatever John R. Schmidt’s aims, the arguments that he has employed do not stand the test of casual perusal leave alone scrutiny.
The subject assumes significance in view of the politics evolving around the idea of negotiating peace, especially with the Taliban, as the West plans to withdraw bulk of their troops by 2014. Though often regarded as flawed, ill-timed, regressive, wobbly, dangerous and unworkable, the idea has nevertheless come to dominate the discourse on the Afghan war. However, principal Afghan opposition forces and networks operating from Pakistan continue to publicly rebuff and mock at the government's initiative.
In a positive movement, ISAF’s peace enforcement operation over time will have to shift to peacekeeping. Thinking through the idea of UN-SAARC hybrid peacekeeping mission now could help catalyse the peace process eventually.
Both India and Pakistan must immediately review their security practices for the protection of vital and vulnerable national assets, which in Pakistan’s case must also include nuclear weapons.
India should seek a regional solution to the Afghan conflict, involving a regional force under a UN flag to provide a stable environment for governance and development till the Afghan National Army can take over.
India needs to engage countries in the region to ensure that the transition process in Afghanistan does not threaten regional stability.
The US needs to take direct charge of the peace talks prong of strategy to meet the mid-2011 deadline of beginning its troops withdrawal as well as to enable NATO departure by 2014.
India must stay engaged, keep a low profile, earn the goodwill of the Afghan people through its multifaceted assistance programme, and stay away from any costly misadventure in the security sector.
Bangladesh is making an important effort domestically to weaken the affiliates of al-Qaeda and Taliban ideology, which is no less important than making contributions to ISAF.
While the US may continue to keep its contacts with the Pakistani army and its political leadership and strengthen its presence in Pakistan, can it contain the tide of Islamic radicalism prospering within Pakistan?



