People's Liberation Army (PLA)

Since taking over power in 2012, the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s key initiative has been to make the Communist Party of China (CPC) relevant in the function of China’s political system. However, when Xi Jinping argues for a ‘unified and absolute leadership of the Party, it has become co-terminous with his absolute control of the Party. What does this centralisation of power signify? Given this context, it is imperative to question under whose control is the Chinese Army. That is, does CPC as an organisation hold absolute command over the PLA or it is Xi Jinping who controls it?

• Amrita Jash
• November 2018
• Strategic Analysis

It will take some time before the PLA can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. But the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the ‘balance of power’ dynamics.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• August 07, 2017
• IDSA Comments

The Chinese stance towards the December 15, 2016 incident relating to the seizure of USN UUV by PLA Navy has been extraordinarily ambiguous.

• Abhay Kumar Singh
• January 03, 2017
• Issue Brief

This monograph identifies the contexts which have shaped China's military strategy and doctrine. It argues that these have evolved through Party-Military relations as well as through the Chinese leadership's assessment of the international balance of power. In this framework, the monograph has traced the PLA's strategic and doctrinal transformation from a defensive one to one of limited offence, having global aspirations, affecting further changes in China's military strategy and doctrine.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• Monograph

The leadership transition in the Rocket Forces shows that the service is not only integrating with other services but that its officials are increasingly called upon to other services to facilitate joint training and exercises.

• M.S. Prathibha
• June 06, 2016
• Special Feature

If PLA doesn’t change its ‘army-centric’ character and make way for professionals with domain expertise, the higher defence organisation will continue to be weak and the reform only in name.

• Mandip Singh
• March 09, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Hitherto, the India-China border dispute was largely a land-air contingency. Now, the PLA Navy’s presence in the IOR adds the third dimension and needs to be factored in future planning and preparations.

• Mandip Singh
• February 22, 2016
• Issue Brief

The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to enable rapid deployment. China will stall resolution of the territorial dispute till it is in a much stronger position.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• September 22, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In the first round of promotions to the senior-most ranks of PLA, Xi Jinping signals building a younger, technological savvy military that needs to be honest and under the control to the party.

• Bijoy Das
• September 25, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Struggling to deal with a rigid China on the intractable border issue, India would do well to digest the core assertions of the white paper, including the growing reach of the PLA, its professionalisation, keenness to protect overseas interests, modernisation of the nuclear arsenal, and growing role in foreign policy making.

• Arvind Gupta
• April 25, 2013
• IDSA Comments