Nuclear

In a new book Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards a Credible Deterrent, Dr. Manpreet Sethi has recommended a restructuring of India’s Nuclear Command Authority. Since India’s nuclear doctrine is premised on ‘Assured Retaliation’, nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Presently, the Nuclear Command Authority, as approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 04 January 2003, stipulates:

• Ali Ahmed
• September 09, 2009
• IDSA Comments

In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a landmark speech in Prague in which he outlined the US policy on nuclear weapons. Speaking of the need to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security, he expressed his commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. He said that the US will negotiate a treaty with Russia on the reduction of strategic weapons before the end of this year when the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expires. He also said his administration would try and secure the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from the US Congress.

• Arvind Gupta
• May 19, 2009
• IDSA Comments

The two global trends of multipolarity (rising powers) and non-polarity (failing states) are strongly present in the South Asian geopolitical context. India's competitive-cooperative relationship with China is clearly part of the multipolar trend of rising powers throughout the world, while India's long, antagonistic history with Pakistan is increasingly witness to a weakening and radicalized Pakistani state. In this mixed strategic environment, Indian nuclear weapons are neither a global bane nor a coercive form of power for compelling a lopsided agreement with Pakistan on Kashmir.

• Michael Kraig
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.

• Prof. Sumit Ganguly
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. I argue that nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war.

• S. Paul Kapur
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

As the new government headed by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu takes charge in Jerusalem, it seems that there are no easy solutions to what Israel perceives to be its central strategic question – how to effectively stop the Iranian nuclear quest. Israel’s leaders across the political spectrum have long maintained that a nuclear capable Iran, coupled with the rhetoric against Israel emanating from Tehran and its help to groups like the Hezbollah and the Hamas, constitutes an existential threat.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• April 08, 2009
• IDSA Comments

North East Asia’s fragile peace is being threatened by North Korea’s planned launch between 4 and 8 April over Japanese territory of a communication satellite. The US and its allies suspect the planned satellite launch to be a long-range ballistic missile test. The prevailing uneasy peace is accentuated by the fact that both a ballistic missile and a satellite launcher operate on very similar technology.

• Pranamita Baruah , Rajaram Panda
• April 02, 2009
• IDSA Comments

If anybody thought that a change of talk in the Bush administration’s Iran policy would be enough to induce the “isolated” Tehran to give up its intransigence and toe the western line, the July 19 meeting proved him or her wrong. Before the Geneva meeting between Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, the US sent feelers to Tehran.

• Stanly Johny
• July 25, 2008
• IDSA Comments