The national security of India rests on two basic and mutually supporting premises. The first, of course, is the internal strength, cohesiveness, and firmness of purpose of the nation. The second is the ability of the country to exist and develop in a changing international environment, the hostility or friendship of which is rarely certain and never absolute. It is with the second aspect that we concern ourselves in this article.
If India’s coastal security has to become strong, it is essential for the police forces in the coastal states to shed their land centric outlook and turn their attention to coastal security duties as well.
Even the otherwise vague 2011 NSG public statement which inserted the NPT angle into the guidelines underlined that the NSG would implement the India-specific exemptions fully.
Leveraging public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy is key to enable India graduate from being a regional power in South Asia to a great power in the Asia-Pacific.
Given the sensitivity attached to defence-related FDI, each investment should be subject to wider review and impact analysis following which the FDI percentage could be determined varying between zero and 100 per cent.
An anti-nuclear movement in India would remain largely a marginal movement with sporadic spurts depending on the issue at hand, the site in question and the political parties involved.
With India’s security apparatus once again standing exposed and the security overhaul envisaged after 26/11 being still a work in progress, it is time for some harsh introspection.
Although on the ground the areas of conflict are specific and do not cover the entire landmass as a map would indicate, the incoherence of the state’s response makes it appear that India is at war with itself.
