The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) is preparing to undergo a major expansion programme. India can assist in enhancing and developing PNGDF’s capabilities without coming into conflict or competition with the Australian interests.
India’s defence modernisation presents enormous opportunities for the Japanese defence industry, which until recently concentrated exclusively on the domestic market in order to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to peace.
It will take just a few deals to be sealed, especially of the co-development/co-production variety, for the present drift in relations being arrested and brought back on an even keel.
There are no laid down procedures for procurement of technology per se. Existing procedures relate to procurement of equipment, weapons systems, platforms and other tangible capabilities.
The Modi’s government determination to adopt a muscular stance on national security and its commitment to expedite defence modernisation are likely to translate into greater political and defence engagement with Israel.
It is difficult to visualise how the Russian offer to make LUH in India could be actualised unless the government invokes ‘strategic considerations’ for making it in India or signs an inter-governmental agreement for that purpose.
There now seems to be greater recognition of India’s concerns on transfer of technology and not just about co-production but also co-development of next generation weapons. The larger objective for India, however, must be to reduce its dependence on import of foreign equipment and modernize its armed forces in the quickest possible timeframe.
The long expected Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) was signed between the governments of India and China on 23 October 2013 in Beijing, during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to the People’s Republic of China. The draft of the agreement had been through close-door negotiations by both the governments for about a year prior to its signing. Incidentally, it was also during these negotiations that a three week long face-to-face incident occurred—in April-May 2013—at Depsang located in the Aksai Chin region which is disputed between India and China.
The objective of this article is to discuss defence cooperation between Malaysia and India in the post-Cold War era (1991–2012), mainly from Malaysia’s perspective. The article is divided into four parts. First, the historical background of Malaysia–India defence cooperation during the colonial period until the Cold War is discussed briefly. Second, defence cooperation in the post-Cold War period involving the three services (air force, navy and army) is examined. Third, certain issues in Malaysia–India defence cooperation are analysed.
