A neo-liberal economy, an integrating component of the global village, a Confucian society ruled by a Leninist Party structure, a 21st century economic modernization endeavour cohabiting with an early 20th century political system, China offers a tantalizing proposition for looking into the crystal ball, and whither China becomes a legitimate subject of inquiry, both fascinating and complicated, full of pitfalls and open to dangerously misleading presumptions.
The PLA Navy (PLAN)'s capabilities in key areas (assets, trained personnel, experience) are currently insufficient to support long-range sea lanes of communication (SLOC) defense missions. With sufficient effort, Beijing may eventually overcome these obstacles, but it would probably also have to acquire some form of overseas basing access, which its foreign policy still proscribes.
This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.
One important feature of China's outer space policy is to carry out cooperation with all countries. In the cooperation, China pays great attention to the rights and demands of developing countries in the high-technology area. With more actors in outer space, it is necessary and urgent to improve the existing legal system regulating the relations of countries and non-state actors. China's attitude to outer space activities is driven by both domestic and international elements. Development, defence, and technological innovation are the three major goals of China's outer space programmes.
As part of its peaceful rise strategy, China has made resolute investments in the field of science and technology. One major aspect of this technological quest has been its investments in space technologies. China's success in this field is remarkable and has brought glory to the nation. However, at the same time, the anti-satellite test (ASAT) undertaken by China, during January 2007, has raised the fears of the weaponization of space.
Under the impact of globalization the Chinese state is caught in the dilemma of intensifying economic reforms on the one hand, and maintaining authoritarian rule on the other. This dichotomy has put China at the crossroads and precipitated a debate between its Left and the Right groups on the direction the Chinese state should take. Hu Jintao sought to address this dilemma by formulating the concept of harmonious development.
The SCO— a linchpin of China's Eurasia policy is viewed ominously by most international watchers. China is nurturing the SCO as an exclusive nucleus to undercut the US strategic outreach. But, Central Asia, the main nucleus, suffers from strategic ambiguity and the states there seek varied goals and play major power off each other. There is also an ostensible mismatch between Russia's liberal and China's expansionist approach. Will the SCO emerge as a distinct pole or will it remain an opportunistic alliance of desperate states?
In a disturbing sign, the Chinese seem to have brought up Sikkim and not Arunachal Pradesh back to the table during the recent visit of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China. The belief was that China had implicitly recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003, and as such there was no dispute on the matter with China. China’s recognition of Sikkim was interpreted as a quid pro quo for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003.
