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  • Pranathi Asked: Will Mars Orbiter Mission outpace China's space dominance over India?

    Ajey Lele replies: The Chinese space programme is much more advanced than the Indian programme. China succeeded in putting its astronaut in space a decade ago in 2003, whereas India has no immediate plan for manned space mission. Shortly, they would be launching their third mission to Moon where a robot would be actually landing on the Moon, while it may take some more time for India to launch its second Moon mission. Also, China has a satellite navigation programme with global reach, which is not the case with India.

    In spite of the above, some believe that India is in a space race with China. It is important to appreciate that “space race” is essentially a Cold War era concept. In the 21st century, for a nation like India, “pragmatism” is the key when deciding on its geopolitical priorities. For India, space is of importance for social and economic reasons. India's space programme is India-specific and not China-specific. It would be naive to think that just because a Chinese satellite could not make it to Mars, India is trying to race with China.

    For more on India’s Mars mission, please refer to Ajey Lele’s following recent publications:

    Ajey Lele, “The late beginner advantage”, Indian Express, November 11, 2013.

    Ajey Lele, Mission Mars: India's Quest for the Red Planet, Springer, 2013.

    China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications

    China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications

    The monograph explores China's perception of India's Look East Policy (LEP) and how that affects India's strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing does not favour a strong Indian presence and influence in Southeast Asia. China is both a determinant and a constraint in India's Look East Policy.

    2013

    China Yearbook 2012

    China Yearbook 2012
    • Publisher: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA)
      2013

    An annual publication from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), The China Yearbook 2012 is a round-up of events and issues of significance that occurred in China during the past year and covers important developments in the domestic and foreign policy spheres.

    • ISBN 978-93-82512-03-5,
    • Price: ₹. 695/-
    • E-copy available
    2013

    PM’s Visit to Russia and China: Need for Smart Diplomacy

    Clubbing the visits to Russia and China is a smart move. But the prime minister will also need to indulge in smart diplomacy to deal with a number of ticklish issues and will have to convince his counterparts that Indian foreign policy is independent and follows national interests.

    October 21, 2013

    Ahmed Zahran asked: What is the latest position of the US, the EU, Russia and China on the Iranian nuclear issue, and what are the possible outcomes of the ongoing negotiation?

    S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom (P5) and Germany (the P5+1) are currently giving push to the 'engagement' track with the latest round of talks which began on October 15, 2013 at Geneva. While existing unilateral and multi-lateral (UNSC and EU) sanctions are in place, no additional sanctions are as yet being contemplated as a part of the 'sanctions' track.

    The 'dual-track' policy of sanctions and engagement has till date not shown much progress in modulating Iranian behaviour. It is pertinent to note that in the past, as the nature and volume of sanctions increased, Iranian intransigence correspondingly increased. Iran for instance suspended its voluntary implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) after its referral to the UNSC in February 2006.

    However, various reports as well as Iranian officials have acknowledged the vulnerable state of the Iranian economy and its currency as a result of trade and oil-related sanctions. President Hassan Rouhani's overwhelming victory defeating candidates like Saeed Jalili (who was the chief nuclear negotiator) has given rise to the strong perception that the Iranian public have rejected the confrontationist approach of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has also supported the path of dialogue, crucially in a speech to the IRGC commanders in September 2013. With the Obama Administration showing its commitment to the dialogue process, the hopes for progress at the current round of negotiations are huge.

    Possible outcomes could range from Iran signing the IAEA AP, temporarily suspending its enrichment activities, the shipping out of excess quantities of enriched uranium (a possibility alluded to by the Iranian Parliament Speaker) in exchange for graduated sanctions relief, provision of spare parts for its civilian aircrafts, among others in a 'grand bargain'.

    These elements are in the realm of the 'possible' given the unique circumstances surrounding the current negotiations, including Rouhani 'the pragmatist' being in power, Khamenei's support for negotiations, weak state of the Iranian economy, and the positive vibes generated by the renewed interactions between the US and Iran topped by the first telephonic conversation between presidents of the two countries in more than three decades.

    China’s ‘Three Warfares’ and India

    For the past decade, China is known to have actively used ‘three warfares’ (3Ws) strategy—media, psychological and legal warfare—to weaken its adversaries in regions constituting what it perceives to be its ‘core interests’. While a wide range of tools have been deployed, the attacks have remained mostly confined to Taiwan and South-East Asian states involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But with Beijing’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) growing, there is evidence emerging of the 3Ws strategy being put to use against India.

    October 2013

    Beyond the Rhetoric of Trilateral Cooperation

    Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.

    September 2013

    A Compromise with India’s Sphere of Influence

    Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.

    September 2013

    Neither Feasible nor Desirable

    Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?

    September 2013

    More Questions than Answers

    Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:

    September 2013

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