Dr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Turkish Policy towards Israel-Hamas War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 April 2025. Dr P.K. Pradhan, Research Fellow and Coordinator, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, moderated the meeting. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and the scholars of the institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The presentation offered a detailed analysis of the historical trajectory, ideological shifts, and strategic recalibrations in Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Israel, particularly in the wake of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza. It provided valuable insights into Ankara’s enduring position on Palestine, its ties with Hamas, legal and diplomatic initiatives, and growing tensions with Israel across multiple domains, including trade, NATO, and the Syrian theatre.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. P.K. Pradhan provided a brief background of Türkiye’s foreign policy and the current war situation in Gaza Strip. Türkiye’s foreign policy has undergone a shift shaped by domestic pressures, ideological positioning, and strategic calculations. Dr. Abhishek Yadav began by outlining the historical foundations of Türkiye–Israel relations. Türkiye was the first Muslim-majority country to recognise Israel in 1949. Bilateral ties grew steadily, culminating in a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and a series of military agreements in 1996 that enabled joint exercises, naval port calls, and cooperation in arms production and counter-terrorism. However, relations sharply deteriorated following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, in which Israeli forces killed ten Turkish activists aboard a Gaza-bound flotilla, which was trying to break land and sea blockade in Gaza. The incident led to the recall of ambassadors and a freeze in high-level engagements.

The speaker noted that Israel and Türkiye driven by strategic and economic interests, began the rapprochement process in June 2016 leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations and full normalisation by 2022. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza drastically altered Ankara’s posture. Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan immediately called for restraint and a de-escalation of hostilities. Ankara convened the Gaza Contact Group meeting during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, pushing for a permanent ceasefire and rejecting US President Trump’s plan which mandated displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. Türkiye also endorsed the Qatar–Egypt–US trilateral ceasefire efforts and supported the Arab League’s US$53 billion Gaza reconstruction initiative. President Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s commitment to a two-state solution based on 1967 borders and condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza as war crimes, accusing it of disregarding the lives of civilians, including women and children. Türkiye has intervened in the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), filing its submission in August 2024. Citing the 1948 Genocide Convention, Ankara argued that it had a legal obligation to act against what it termed Israel’s genocidal actions in Gaza. However, Dr. Yadav noted concerns amongst the opposition parties about potential reciprocal legal claims, particularly regarding the Armenian issue.

A notable aspect of Ankara’s policy has been its overt engagement with Hamas. Erdoğan publicly described Hamas as a resistance movement or liberation group, not a terrorist organisation, and led a large pro-Hamas rally in Istanbul on 28 October 2023. Senior Turkish officials, including Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Fidan, held direct meetings with Hamas leaders in Ankara in April 2025 to discuss humanitarian aid, halting Israeli operations, and advancing ceasefire proposals. Such alignment reflects both ideological affinities and Erdoğan’s long-standing political narrative that frames Türkiye as a defender of Palestinian rights and Islamic solidarity. Türkiye-Hamas ties can be divided into two key aspects. Firstly, the ideological and political ties, which includes the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood; secondly, diplomatic support, including high-level negotiations, hosting Hamas figures. Regarding aid efforts to Gaza, Türkiye has been a consistent donor to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), contributing US$ 88.34 million from 2020 to 2023.

Notably, Türkiye is Israel’s fifth largest source of imported goods; the bilateral trade volume was US$ 7.06 billion in 2023. In response to domestic pressure and regional developments, Türkiye escalated its economic measures against Israel. On 9 April 2024, Ankara imposed export bans on 1,019 construction-related items. On 2 May 2024, Türkiye completely suspended all bilateral trade with Israel, one of the most severe economic steps taken by any country in protest of the Gaza war. Dr. Yadav emphasised the political motivations behind these decisions, noting that Erdoğan’s AKP had suffered electoral setbacks in the March 2024 local elections. The Islamist Yeniden Refah Party (YRP) capitalised on public anger over Gaza, capturing two AKP stronghold provinces and forcing Erdoğan to take a tougher stand to retain support from conservatives.

The deterioration in bilateral ties has extended beyond diplomacy and trade into multilateral forums and regional security. At the July 2024 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit, Türkiye publicly opposed Israeli participation in NATO-related initiatives, blocking its involvement in an emergency preparedness drill scheduled in Bulgaria. Erdoğan declared that Türkiye would not support Israeli engagement within NATO until a sustainable peace based on the two-state solution was realised.

Moreover, Türkiye denied Israeli military aircraft and President Isaac Herzog overflight permissions, forcing rerouting and leading to the cancellation of Herzog’s participation in the COP29 summit in Baku. Additionally, tensions have emerged over Syria. Israeli strikes disrupted Türkiye’s attempts to survey and access Syrian airbases for joint defence operations in April 2025. Ankara warned Israel against testing Türkiye’s patience. A high-level deconfliction meeting was held in Baku in April 2025, mediated by Azerbaijan. However, Turkish airspace was denied to the Israel’s delegation for this meeting.

Dr. Yadav concluded that Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Israel since October 2023 reflects an ideological–strategic convergence with Palestinian cause and support for Hamas. Türkiye, through its support for the Palestinian issue, seeks to display its ideological commitment and claim a regional leadership role in the West Asian region. Bilateral ties currently are at an all-time low, and economic interdependence has been unable to stabilise ties particularly this time. The emerging areas of conflict now span legal, military, economic, and multilateral domains that include the ICJ case, bilateral trade, NATO-Israel ties, airspace denial, and rivalry in post-Assad Syria.

Q&A Session

The session concluded with an insightful exchange of views among scholars during the Q&A session regarding Türkiye’s dynamics with Gulf States, AKP-Muslim Brotherhood ideological affinity, Ankara’s position on Hezbollah and Palestinian factions and Türkiye-US ties. Dr. Abhishek Yadav responded to the comments and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.

The report has been prepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.