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Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on “Israel-Iran War: Implications for the Region”
July 14, 2025
Dr. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Israel-Iran War: Implications for the Region” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 14 July 2025. Dr. Abhishek Yadav, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, moderated the meeting. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and the scholars of the institute attended the discussion.
Executive Summary
The presentation offered a detailed analysis of the Israel-Iran war by focusing on the Iran-Israel deterrence relationship and the mechanics of escalation during the conflict. The discussion also covered the response of regional states, the US’ interests in the region and the possibility of new regional uncertainties in the context of a weaker Iran.
Detailed Report
In his opening remarks, moderator, Dr. Abhishek Yadav provided a brief background of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, emphasising a ‘new normal’, i.e., the possibility of US and Israeli military action if Iran attempts to advance its nuclear programme. He also noted that a weak Iran could create a vacuum of power and influence, creating new sites of regional tensions in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
The speaker, Dr. Deepika Saraswat outlined five broad themes, i.e. unravelling of the Israel-Iran deterrence relationship; mechanics of escalation during the war; the US role; regional responses; a reconfigured regional geopolitical landscape and the way forward for Iran.
Dr. Saraswat noted that Israel’s military campaign since October 2023 has eroded Iran’s indirect deterrence strategy. Iran, lacking in air power, has prioritised ballistic missiles at the core of its strategy of deterrence by punishment through a credible threat of significant retaliation. Iran, post-October 2023 attack, followed a restrained approach and attempted to limit Hezbollah’s actions against Israel, which led Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to seize the strategic initiative and expand their campaign against the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance.’ Iran’s previous missile attacks in April and October 2024 were intended to send a strategic message and deter the opponent. The deterrence however did not work.
Israel’s strategic calculus post-October attack and its expanded risk tolerance further undermined the Iranian deterrence strategy. With greater US support, Israel has sustained its military momentum to degrade Iran’s allies and damage Iran’s nuclear and military assets with the broader objective of changing the map of the region. Dr. Saraswat opined that Israel acted on this window of opportunity while framing it as a much-needed preemptive strike to eliminate a supposed ‘imminent threat’. The US intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief have pointed to the absence of an active plan by Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Further, nuclear weapons are often sought as a tool for state survival and deterrence.
Dr. Saraswat noted that in terms of the mechanics of escalation, several top military leaders and nuclear scientists were killed. IDF targeted strikes against Iran’s air defence and offensive capabilities and industry in order to make it difficult for Iranian forces to retaliate. IDF expanded the scope of the conflict by striking the energy infrastructure and issued repeated evacuation orders for districts in Tehran. Israel’s key objectives were to erode military and nuclear capabilities and create popular pressure and unrest forcing the regime’s surrender or collapse. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Haifa refinery and the Weizmann Institute of Science demonstrated Iran’s capabilities of symmetrical action. Iran primarily used smaller missiles, possibly due to damage to its missile deployment sites. Iran shifted towards countervalue strikes against major urban centres to raise the cost for Israel and potentially deter further Israeli military actions.
Saudi Arabia and Turkiye condemned Israel’s pre-emptive attack. Dr. Saraswat mentioned that these states provided a more muted response to US strikes, calling for restraint. Notably, Gulf States, since the October 2023 attack, have engaged in continuous dialogue and intensive diplomacy with Iran to avoid regionalisation of the conflict. While the US military assets positioned in the Gulf States were not used in the American operations against Iran; however, there was no guarantee that they will not become a target in retaliation by Iran. Gulf States could benefit from a weak Iran, and its regional retreat may moderate sectarian geopolitics, leading to greater Arab cohesion. A more internally focused Iran could slow down backing of sectarian groups in the region.
Israeli-driven geopolitical change is a challenge to regional stability. Israel seeks security through military dominance. Dr. Saraswat focused on pertinent issues like the possibility of the return of inter-state wars, the status of the Abraham Accords and the Turkish threat perceptions of a militarily ascendant Israel. Post 2011 Arab Spring, non-Arab players, Iran and Turkiye expanded their regional influence. There is looming potential for confrontation between Israel and Turkiye in Syria.
With reference to the way forward, Dr. Saraswat stated that Iran will struggle to counter possible Israeli covert operations. Iran will focus on a defensive strategy of strengthening its counter-intelligence architecture, rebuilding its defence industrial base and seeking greater unity between government and people. Iran has to decide between a conciliatory diplomatic approach and pursuing its nuclear option to gain strategic parity with Israel.
Q & A Session
During the Q&A session, Dr. Yadav invited the participants to pose questions on the Israel-Iran war. Questions raised from the floor were with reference to the new rules of engagement; narrative building within Iran; US’ long term interest; Israel-Azerbaijan alliance; China’s role; Iran’s deterrence vis a vis Saudi Arabia and and the impact of Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) within Iran.
Dr. Saraswat argued that the US has maintained coercive diplomacy to contain Iran’s nuclear programme. The US has escalation dominance, which can escalate conflict and de-escalate based on its interests. In terms of new rules of engagement, Israel, with western support, has normalised the idea of direct attack on Iran. To overcome the current predicament, the Islamic Republic may respond positively to a creative diplomatic solution to the enrichment issue. The speaker opined that Iran agreed to an agreement like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which contained but normalised Iran’s nuclear program. Hassan Rouhani came to power because he sought to balance between the nuclear aspirations and domestic considerations to revive the economy.
Dr. Saraswat mentioned that Iran, while being aware of the Israel-Azerbaijan alliance and the use of Azeri airspace by the IDF, has limited options. Due to Turkiye’s backing of Azerbaijan, Iran has primarily employed a deterrent posture. Moreover, the Azeri population also shapes Iran’s foreign policy behaviour. It has so far avoided coercive posture. The speaker responded that Iran’s post-war state narrative is focused on greater national unity. The public narrative has become more Iran-centric rather than Ummah-centric. The MKO has ties with the US neo-conservatives and Israel. The group, however, does not enjoy support within Iran. Deep Israeli intelligence penetration could provide a role for the group.
Dr. Saraswat noted that China sees value in Iran’s ability to frustrate US designs in the region. Beijing, however, does not support Tehran’s adventurous regional postures, leading to instability. Beijing brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to foster regional stability necessary for China’s economic projects. Following the recent war, there is a growing perspective within Iran that the Saudi deal has, in fact, limited Iran’s military options in the fight against Israel. While Iran’s deterrence is weakened, it still has sufficient capabilities to externalise the costs through overt and covert actions in the Strait of Hormuz, deterring the US from escalating the situation.
The report has been prepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.