Dr. Uttam K Sinha, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA) spoke on “Indus Waters Treaty: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 2 June 2025. Dr Ashok K Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA moderated the meeting. Scholars of MP-IDSA participated in the discussion.

Executive Summary

The session provided a focused and critical evaluation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)—its historical design, evolving bilateral tensions, and future strategic direction. The discussion emphasised India’s underutilisation of its treaty rights, the political and technical pitfalls of the original agreement, and the urgency of a renegotiation grounded in engineering and strategic foresight.

Detailed Report

Dr. Ashok Behuria opened the session by contextualising the Treaty’s current status of “abeyance,” highlighting the political friction between India and Pakistan. He noted that Pakistan has accused India of reducing water flow by 21%, a claim not supported by hydrological evidence. On the contrary, due to climate variability, Pakistan has received ample water over the past two decades. He attributed Pakistan’s anxieties to the reduced per capita availability of water over the last decade.

Dr. Behuria pointed out that the IWT is a “partition treaty”—a cooperative framework within a rigid division. He noted that Pakistan’s water mismanagement is systemic: despite having access to 146 MAF, it effectively uses only about 102 MAF. He stressed the need for treaty reform, especially with greater participation from technical experts, not just legal authorities.

Dr. Sinha structured his analysis around three key axes: Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, and water sharing. He emphasised that the IWT, signed in 1960 amid political hostility, has no exit clause but has endured for 65 years. Its origins reflect contrasting strategies—India’s technical engagement vs. Pakistan’s legal internationalisation, backed by the World Bank. He explained that firstly the Indus basin, one of the world’s most complex, was unnaturally divided post-Partition. India retained the eastern rivers; Pakistan was allocated the western ones. Secondly, India has achieved only 0.7 MAF of its 3.6 MAF water storage entitlement on the western rivers, weakening its upstream position. Thirdly the Treaty is not one of water sharing, but of water allocation by dividing the Indus Basin into western and eastern rivers. Terms like “stoppage” are politicised by Pakistan to evoke international sympathy.

Dr. Sinha clarified that India has not abrogated the Treaty—it is in abeyance, meaning India is re-evaluating its adherence. The current Indian approach emphasises exercising full entitlements under the Treaty, reframing the language of water discourse—from legalistic semantics to engineering-cantered pragmatism, and constructing strategic storage infrastructure on the western rivers, to retain water that currently flows unused to Pakistan.

According to Dr. Sinha, Pakistan’s control of 65% of the basin’s catchment has not translated into efficiency. The real strategic threat lies in Pakistan’s politicisation of hydrology, not in India’s actions.

Dr. Sinha elucidated that India is advocating for a technically driven renegotiation of the IWT such that future negotiations must incorporate climate change, low-flow patterns, and hydrological variability. The dispute resolution mechanism should exclude third-party arbitration, replacing it with bilateral engineering panels. Also, India seeks to evolve the Treaty from a narrow dispute resolution mechanism into a basin governance framework.

Q&A Session

Participants raised questions about whether India’s move toward abeyance signals a step toward abrogation and whether it could incentivise Pakistan to renegotiate. Others asked about China’s role as the upper riparian in the Brahmaputra basin and how that might influence India’s position.

Dr. Sinha in response, stated that abeyance is a deliberate administrative action, not a symbolic gesture. It signals India’s intent to assert its rights. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) does not apply to India, which never signed it, and the IWT predates it. Pakistan has signed it but not ratified it. The Treaty must evolve alongside India’s developmental needs. Engineers, not just diplomats or legalists, should shape future negotiations. He opined that China’s upstream position over the Brahmaputra introduces another layer of complexity, making it essential for India to strengthen internal water resilience and regional diplomatic coalitions.

According to Dr. Sinha, India’s current position reflects a mature and strategic reassessment of the IWT. The goal is not unilateral withdrawal, but a technically sound renegotiation that reflects today’s geopolitical realities and climatic challenges. India must build storage capacity, invest in climate-resilient infrastructure, and assert its rights within a restructured, bilateral framework.

Report prepared by Mr. Atharva Samir Mulye, Intern, Non-Traditional Security Centre, MP-IDSA