Mr. Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Nuclear Factor in Israel-Iran War” held on 7 July 2025. The session was moderated by Mr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The session examined the escalating nuclear dimension of the Iran-Israel conflict, focusing on how recent Israeli and U.S. strikes under Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer, respectively, severely damaged Iran’s nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak. Despite these attacks, Iran preserved key stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and retained its technological infrastructure, keeping its nuclear breakout capability intact. In response, Iran launched Operation True Promise III, unleashing waves of ballistic missiles and drones on Israeli strategic assets and U.S. bases in Qatar. The discussion traced Iran’s nuclear trajectory from the 1950s, through post-1979 clandestine activities, and its expanding uranium enrichment beyond Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) constraints, reaching levels close to weapons grade. It was noted that while Israeli operations might delay Iran’s programme by years, they risk pushing Iran to overtly pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. This evolving confrontation revealed deep weaknesses in the NPT regime and eroded confidence in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safeguards, posing broader challenges to regional stability and global non-proliferation norms.

Detailed Report

Mr. Abhishek Verma opened the session by outlining the tense developments in the Iran-Israel conflict, noting that after the recent 12-day war and strikes by the U.S. and Israel on Iranian nuclear sites, Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA, blocking inspectors from monitoring its nuclear programme. Iran has demanded security guarantees for its nuclear facilities and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s 12 June 2025 report highlighted Iran’s continued non-compliance with safeguard obligations, including failing to explain uranium traces at undeclared sites in Varamin, Marivan, and Turquzabad. Iran’s threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could signal a push towards nuclear proliferation to deter future attacks or to extract concessions from the U.S.

Mr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation by stating that on 13 June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion targeting Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure, military personnel, and nuclear sites. The strikes eliminated significant Iranian leadership and killed ten nuclear scientists with key facilities at Natanz, Isfahan and Arak. Subsequently, on 22 June 2025, under Operation Midnight Hammer the U.S. deployed aircraft to strike Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites. Fordow is believed to house advanced IR-6 centrifuges enriching uranium up to 60% and deeply buried, seven B-2 bombers dropped 14 GBU-57 bunker busters, capable of penetrating 60 feet of concrete and 200 feet of earth, while two dozen Tomahawk missiles targeted Isfahan, delivering a severe blow to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

In response to the U.S. strikes, Iran launched Operation True Promise III, marking its third major retaliation. Operation True Promise III involved 22 waves of hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones targeting Israel’s facilities. Iranian media claimed two Israeli F-35s were downed. Additionally, in retaliation against the U.S., Iran fired missiles at the Al Udeid U.S. base in Qatar under Operation Harbinger of Conquest. This escalation prompted President Trump to call for a ceasefire, with Iran declaring it had taught a “historic lesson” to Israel and Israel claiming victory.

Against this backdrop, Mr. Oak emphasised that Israel sees Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat. He recalled that while Iran is an original NPT signatory and began its nuclear programme in the 1950s, the late 1990s saw Iran’s leadership approve the Amad Plan to develop nuclear weapons by 2004. This trajectory was disrupted when secret sites at Natanz and Arak were exposed in 2002, followed by the 2009 revelation of Fordow near Qom, breaching Iran’s Safeguards Agreement obligations.

The JCPOA (2015) capped Iran’s enrichment at 3.67% and limited stockpiles to 300 kg, but after the U.S. exit in 2018 under Trump, Iran resumed 20% enrichment in 2020, deployed advanced centrifuges, and produced uranium metal. Biden’s Treaty revival efforts failed, with Iran reaching 60% enrichment by 2023. By June 2022, Iran had disconnected all JCPOA monitoring equipment, accelerating its nuclear programme and deepening global concerns.

Israel is not a NPT signatory. It is widely believed to possess nuclear warheads, though it maintains a deliberate policy of nuclear opacity. The 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding cemented U.S. acceptance of Israel’s ambiguous nuclear status, so long as it remained invisible and opaque. Israel’s security doctrine was shaped by the Begin Doctrine (1981). Israel has since covertly targeted Iran’s nuclear programme.

Meanwhile, indirect U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in April 2025 offered Iran civilian reactors and a multinational enrichment model in exchange for halting domestic enrichment, but Iran rejected this, demanding complete sanctions relief and insisting on its NPT right to enrich uranium. Simultaneously, IAEA reports in May and June 2025 highlighted Iran’s alarming 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium, its failure to explain uranium traces at undeclared sites and Iran’s suspension of JCPOA monitoring measures, prompting Israel to brand Iran’s actions a clandestine weapons drive.

In this climate, the U.S. and Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites, claiming major damage. However, satellite images showed Iran had safeguarded key uranium stockpiles and retained core infrastructure. The IAEA confirmed serious damage but warned Iran could still produce nuclear weapons within months due to its industrial and technological capacity. In response, Iran threatened to end IAEA cooperation and claimed undisclosed facilities were secured. The incident highlighted ambiguities in the NPT, especially its lack of clear limits on uranium enrichment levels.

Mr. Oak observed that Israel’s recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have severely undermined the credibility of both the IAEA and the global non-proliferation regime. The attacks may send a message that the IAEA does not ensure the security of nuclear infrastructure, potentially discouraging other states from adhering to non-proliferation commitments. He noted that Iran has exploited ambiguities within the NPT, enriching uranium up to 60% without explicit treaty violations.

While the Israeli operations have demonstrated unmatched air superiority and intelligence penetration, temporarily slowing Iran’s nuclear progress and reinforcing deterrence, they have not eliminated Iran’s accumulated uranium or the nuclear knowledge. Mr. Oak concluded by highlighting that Iran could rebuild its capabilities and rapidly produce a nuclear weapon, driven by the strategic logic of compensating for conventional weaknesses.

Questions and Comments

During the discussion, participants raised several critical questions and observations. They deliberated on how Israel might respond if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and what the broader implications would be if Iran were to quit the NPT regime. Concerns were voiced about whether the repeated targeting of nuclear facilities by state actors signals a new normalisation of such pre-emptive strikes on nuclear sites. It was noted that Iran has never unilaterally withdrawn from agreements; rather, it has often been in response to the U.S. decisions.  However, it was wrong on the part of Iran to enrich uranium near weapons grade, though technically Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the NPT. Iran has not given any justification regarding the utility of uranium enriched up to 60%.  The proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East was also discussed. Finally, there was a discussion on the independence of the IAEA. Mr. Oak answered all the questions and the session was concluded after an insightful exchange.

The Report was prepared by Ms. Bhawna, Research Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.