Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang, Senior Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Aeronautics R&D and Self-Reliance in India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 07 April 2025. The session was chaired by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The session explored the history of aeronautics R&D in India, with a particular focus on the development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It examined the key factors behind the delays in the project and discussed the path forward for achieving greater self-reliance and efficiency in indigenous aircraft development.

Detailed Report

Col.(Dr.) Rajneesh Singh began his talk by emphasising the importance of understanding the nuances of the defence ecosystem in order to grasp the full journey of its development. This understanding, he said, is essential to understand the way forward. Tracing the history of India’s defence industry, he noted that it dates back to the East India Company, which set up the first ordnance factory in the 18th century, followed by the establishment of a gunpowder factory. During World War II, the number of defence factories in India significantly increased. After independence, policymakers placed a strong emphasis on Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) to develop the country’s ordnance capabilities.

Col. Singh further outlined the post-independence trajectory of India’s defence sector in four distinct phases. From 1947 to the 1960s, the primary focus was on achieving self-sufficiency. Between 1963 and the mid-1980s, the emphasis shifted towards self-reliance. This was followed, up until the late 1990s, by a period marked by the import of advanced defence platforms. Subsequently, there was a transition towards self-reliance through co-production with foreign companies. Following the Kargil conflict, the focus moved further towards self-reliance, with increased collaboration and involvement of the private sector. He further emphasised that India is now witnessing a return to the spirit of the “Marut Movement,” symbolising a renewed push for indigenous defence production and self-reliance.

Gp. Capt Narang began his presentation by clarifying that the current phase is not a revival of the Marut movement but also the “Orpheus engine moment.” He highlighted the concerns expressed by Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh, regarding the delays in delivery of the LCA Tejas Mk-1A during the Aero India 2025.

Tracing the historical context, he emphasised the importance of understanding the complexities behind the delays in India’s indigenous fighter development programs. He pointed out that challenges were not limited to the LCA alone but also included issues related to the naval variant, the Kaveri engine program, and other indigenous development projects that were delayed due to systemic, synergy, and decision-making challenges. He stressed that identifying the root causes of these delays is essential to finding long-term solutions.

He then outlined the history of the LCA program. In 1983, a decision was made to develop the LCA, but he noted that a decision does not equate to the immediate start of a project, as approvals and groundwork take time. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was established in 1984 to oversee the project, and Dr. Raj Mahindra, then the most respected engineer at HAL, was appointed as the LCA’s first project director. The Indian Air Force formulated the Qualitative Requirements (QRs) in 1985. However, the appointment of Dr. Mahindra soon became a point of contention, marking the beginning of internal challenges within the program. This led to the resignation of Dr. Raj Mahindra, causing significant setbacks to the program. In addition, the LCA project again faced criticism and came under scrutiny when a Parliamentary Committee was set up to review the project in 1989; however, the committee cleared the project. As a result, the LCA project experienced delays, and it was in 2001 that the aircraft took its maiden flight, nearly 40 years after the Marut.

Gp. Capt. Narang went on to explain that several additional factors contribute to delays in defence projects and must be adequately understood. The LCA, like any other development project, has undergone multiple modifications and upgrades requiring the integration of new and advanced systems. When a new system has to be integrated into an indigenous aircraft, it involves multiple layers of decision-making, ranging from identifying suitable manufacturers to conducting negotiations and addressing challenges in software and hardware integration. Moreover, the certification process is extremely stringent, and while improvements in capabilities are essential, they also introduce further delays.

In 2009, the two-seater LCA trainer completed its first flight, which was followed by the Initial Operational Clearance of LCA in 2013. By 2015, the first Tejas aircraft was formally delivered to the Indian Air Force. The LCA Mk-1 also served as a testbed for the development of the advanced Mk-1A variant. In November 2023, the IAF signed a deal for the procurement of 83 LCA Mk-1A aircraft. However, the introduction of new QRs in the contract added complexity and time to the development process, as integrating additional enhancements naturally extends the timeline.

Turning to the issue of the LCA Navy, Gp. Capt. Narang highlighted that naval requirements are fundamentally different from those of the Air Force. Also, the Indian Navy joined later in the LCA project when the naval variant of the LCA was officially sanctioned in 2003, and its first flight took place in 2012, primarily because the entire design had to be reworked to meet the Navy’s specific operational needs. It was later decided to develop LCA Mk-2 with a more powerful engine to enhance range and payload carrying capacity. This necessitated significant redesigns by ADA, including modifications to the wings, reduction in aerodynamic drag, improvements in maintainability, and an increase in payload capacity.

He also emphasised that financial considerations play a critical role in such long-term development projects. The development delays are often influenced by irregular or phased funding. For a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges, he stressed the need to closely examine the year-wise pattern of fund approvals and actual disbursements.

Regarding the Kaveri engine of LCA, Gp. Capt. Narang drew a parallel with the Orpheus engine of Marut fighter aircraft, noting that both faced similar challenges. The Orpheus engine was initially unable to meet the thrust requirements of the Marut. Similarly, the Kaveri engine, developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in 1986, partnered with international firms such as Snecma to aid in Kaveri’s development. However, disagreements over cost and terms eventually led to the partnership’s breakdown. The development of the Kaveri engine was delayed, and India opted to procure the General Electric F404 in 2008 and, later, the more advanced F414 engine. The challenges of the Orpheus engine were not addressed, and its upgradation did not persist, and the Kaveri engine faced similar challenges.

Furthermore, he identified several key reasons for delays in the LCA program: international sanctions and component denial post-nuclear tests, prolonged testing and certification processes, and manufacturing delays by HAL. He, however, expressed concerns regarding delays in launching the indigenous Naval fighter development program as the Indian Navy has neither joined the LCA Mk-2 nor the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) development program. Indian Navy has instead sought the development of Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) aircraft, which is yet to be approved. He also highlighted the need to revisit the Indian Navy’s approach to seeking the development of 4.5 generation TEDBF instead of 5.5 generation AMCA as TEDBF due to envisaged survivability challenges against fifth and sixth generation fighters of China. A swift decision on a naval fighter is crucial to prevent long-term import dependency. At last, he outlined a ten-point template to understand delays in defence projects, highlighting issues like delays in approvals, funding, lack of engine testing infrastructure, project downgrading, stakeholder inefficiencies, changing QRs, and lack of accountability and need for establishing a Defence and Aeronautics Commission on the lines of the Space Commission.

Q&A Session

A lively Q&A session followed the talk. On the question of ensuring a steady annual supply of aircraft, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised that while imports may offer a limited edge, true sustainability lies in going indigenous. He stressed the need for India to continue with the development of its after-burner variant of the Kaveri engine while pursuing the Transfer of Technology (ToT) of the GE 414. In contrast, he noted that China began from a similar position but made faster progress by focusing on specifics, especially during ToT agreements, which enabled them to develop their engines effectively. India, he argued, must adopt a similar approach with focused, parallel development programs.

The Report was prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma, Research Analyst, North America and Strategic Technologies Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.