Events

The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, on “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges” was held on 29 February 2024. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Satish Kumar Namdeo Ghormade, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd.), former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The External Discussants for the paper were Commander Abhijit Singh, Head, Maritime Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and Dr. Pooja Bhatt, Consultant, Ministry of External Affairs and Researcher on Maritime Security and Governance. The Internal Discussants were Ms. Ruchita Beri, Consultant, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, & UN (ALACUN) Centre, MP-IDSA, and Cmde. Abhay K. Singh, Research Fellow & Coordinator, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

The development of a maritime security agenda for African countries has been relatively new, despite the continent being completely surrounded by water. Following the emergence of the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, African countries and international actors started to pay due attention to ensuring maritime security. Although armed robbery at sea has sensitised the countries of Africa and the international community to the threats in the African maritime domain (AMD), an overemphasis on piracy and armed robbery has skewed perceptions about the African maritime landscape. The challenges today are much broader, and the resultant strategies employed by African countries go beyond tackling piracy. Thus, in the present time, African maritime strategies tend to focus on the common interests of wealth creation and sustainable governance.

Detailed Report

Dr. Mishra’s research explored the potential of the "blue economy" or "blue growth" approach in mitigating maritime crime in African waters. He also examined the evolution of maritime security within the African context over the past two decades.

Previously neglected, Dr. Mishra argued that Africa's colonial past fostered a "sea blindness," hindering a focus on maritime security. He emphasised the ambiguity of the term "maritime security," highlighting the varying interpretations by Till (2018) with hard and soft security distinctions, Bueger's (2015) constructivist approach with the Maritime Security Matrix, and Siebels' (2020) "Tale of Two Regions'' incorporating positive and negative definitions.

He further underscored the criticality of Africa's maritime sector. Firstly, 38 out of 54 African territories are island nations or coastal states. Secondly, Africa boasts a vast coastline exceeding 26,000 nautical miles. Finally, the number and capabilities of actors threatening the African Maritime Domain (AMD) are continuously rising. These factors necessitate a commensurate response at national, regional, and continental levels.

Moreover, while explaining the threats and vulnerabilities of the African Maritime Domain (AMD), he categorised them into three main areas. Governance issues encompass illicit fishing, marine pollution, illegal oil bunkering, and crude oil theft. Security concerns include armed robbery, piracy, and trafficking in weapons, drugs, and wildlife. Finally, humanitarian assistance needs encompass Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and out-of-area emergencies.

He then highlighted the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index, which ranks nations based on nine criteria relevant to Africa, including global cooperation, legality, maritime safety, coastal well-being, the blue economy, fishing practices, piracy, illegal trade, and mixed migration via sea.

However, Dr. Mishra acknowledged the ongoing debate surrounding maritime security (MS) in Africa. He said that scholars grapple with a unified definition within the African context. Since 2005, the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the African Union Commission (AUC) have actively discussed the African Maritime Domain (AMD) primarily in relation to piracy. The initial discourse revealed diverse interests and a complex web of African-international relationships. Notably, African RECs have collaborated with the United Nations, International Maritime Organization, and other nations.

He further emphasised Africa's pre-existing engagement in maritime governance. By 2000, 37 African nations were already members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the continent had a maritime transit charter established in 1993. Additionally, African countries ratified key agreements like the 1974 SOLAS Convention (safety of life at sea) and the 2004 ISPS Code (security of ships and port facilities).

The 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) provided the foundation for the first pan-African initiatives to bolster SAR capabilities. Between 2007 and 2011, five Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs) and twenty-six sub-centers were established in strategic locations like Mombasa, Cape Town, Lagos, Monrovia, and Rabat.

Dr. Mishra also highlighted the significance of informal gatherings and conferences fostering maritime cooperation since 2005. These include the IMO-sponsored Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS), the U.S. Naval Command's East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference (EASWIO), and the Indian Navy's Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), alongside regional meetings in Sana'a, Muscat, and Dar es Salaam. The establishment of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in January 2009 marked a further step towards regional cooperation.

Moreover, Dr. Mishra made a distinction between the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). Adopted in January 2009, the DCoC focuses on piracy and armed robbery suppression in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Its core objective is to facilitate international cooperation through information sharing, training nitiatives, national legislation updates, and counter-piracy measures. The DCoC+, established through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment, addresses additional threats like illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and human trafficking.

On the other hand, the YCoC, ratified in 2013 by 25 West and Central African nations, targets a broader range of illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, including piracy, armed robbery, and IUU fishing. Information sharing is a central pillar, achieved through two regional centers: (i) Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and (ii) the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Dr. Mishra highlighted key differences. The DCoC, designed from the outset to combat piracy on the high seas, actively seeks international assistance. Conversely, the YCoC prioritizes preserving signatory sovereignty. Additionally, the YCoC incorporates measures absent from the DCoC, such as seizing assets linked to illicit activities, mitigating IUU fishing, and addressing pollution prevention (a broader maritime concern beyond traditional security). Finally, the YCoC uses the term "signatories," while the DCoC uses "participants."

He moved on to explain Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM 2050) as a unified effort to revitalize the maritime sector for the continent's development. AIM 2050 aims to leverage Africa's waterways and oceans for the benefit of its maritime industries. Additionally, the African Union (AU) is fostering a maritime security community tailored to Africa's unique needs, experiences, and practices.

He discussed the Lomé Charter, formally known as the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety, and Development in Africa, signed in October 2016. It builds upon the AIM 2050 Strategy by transitioning maritime security in Africa from a "soft law" approach (non-binding guidelines) to a "hard law" approach with a legally binding treaty. This shift is in contrast to earlier instruments like the DCoC or AIM 2050. Notably, while 25 nations signed the Lomé Charter, only Benin, Senegal, and Togo have ratified it thus far.

In addition to that, he emphasised the AU's focus on promoting sustainable utilization of Africa's ocean resources. He terms the Blue Economy (BE) as the "new frontier for Africa's renaissance," highlighting its significance. The 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, served as a key platform to discuss the applicability of the Blue Economy concept in Africa.

In conclusion, Dr. Abhishek acknowledged the mixed success of various community-based and government-led Blue Economy initiatives in Africa. He argued that social equity and ecological sustainability haven't received the same level of attention as economic benefits. He emphasized that people are the foundation of any successful Blue Economy endeavour. For Africa's Blue Economy development to thrive, it must prioritise social fairness, environmental preservation, and a robust institutional governance framework.

This was followed by Comments from the External Discussants.

Comments and Questions

Following Dr. Mishra’s presentation, the discussion shifted, with Cdr. Abhijit Singh emphasizing the value of the "sea blindness" concept in academic and policy circles. He linked national security postures to global commons management, highlighting how a state's sea blindness or sea consciousness can impact its ability to address global maritime challenges. He argued that fragmented perspectives and challenges to coordination among African nations hinder effective action. He identified poverty and poor governance (extending to maritime domains) as key issues. He also mentioned CRESMAC and CRESMAO as maritime information centers focused on West and Central Africa. He made the case that we have to identify the challenges facing Africa's marine sector and provide a targeted set of solutions. He stated that the lack of an Indian policy perspective in the study is the sole area of concern. Lastly, he said it is essential to assess each of the instruments mentioned above closely.

Dr. Pooja Bhatt then offered insights on Africa's evolving maritime approach. She noted a shift from the basic needs (food, security, and resources) to complex issues like trade, the security of traditional and non-traditional rights, and the intricate legal and technical aspects of addressing these challenges. Moreover, she emphasised the importance of definitions in maritime security. Clear definitions help identify stakeholders and goals, facilitating collaboration. However, excessive focus on definitions can hinder progress. She commended the AU's approach as a valuable model for regional cooperation on maritime security. Dr. Bhatt concluded by urging India to take a leadership role in establishing a dedicated maritime security office within the United Nations, advocating a collective vision from the Global South on maritime security.

This was followed by Comments from the Internal Discussants.

Ms. Ruchita Beri highlighted the historical perception of land as a place to reside and the sea as a passage. This perspective shapes how power and security are traditionally viewed, often neglecting the maritime domain. She pointed to the Berlin Conference's impact on Africa, where colonial powers focused on land wealth and used the seas for resource extraction, neglecting maritime security concerns. She went on to point out the various narratives developed in maritime security, shaped by African think tanks and academics. She urged Dr. Mishra to delve into questions pertaining to the root causes of the conduct of the African nations and the persistence of the problems in the region.

Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh cautioned against a singular view of African maritime security. He identified two key schools of thought within Africa and argued that security is not solely about laws and standards. Power, strategy, and wealth are crucial elements for effective maritime security, and Africa's challenges in these areas contribute to its maritime insecurity. He asked Dr. Mishra to elaborate on a postmodernist viewpoint, focusing on the rationale for the existence of this information and the reasons behind the state of affairs.

This was followed by Comments from the Floor.

Director General, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy stated that the whole issue is being explored without delving into the essential question of what it is about Africa's economic growth that genuinely shapes its marine environment. There is undoubtedly substantial economic hardship that exists in the littoral regions, which extends to the marine environment and vice versa. Furthermore, as an Indian researcher studying the topic, he asked Dr. Mishra to consider the Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and expand on what specific aspect of the G20 proclamation seems to have been tailored specifically for today's theme.

When the house was opened for questions, a question regarding Africa’s opposition to Western-led security formations was raised. The panelists responded by highlighting China's growing role in African security, noting the 2023 China-Africa Security Forum as a point of geopolitical interest to India.

Vice Admiral Satishkumar Namdeo Ghormade concluded the discussion by emphasising the strategic significance of Africa's resources and location. He attributed the continent's vulnerability to a lack of technology, defensive forces, and the multitude of challenges it faces.

The Report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana, Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.

Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Formation of Government in Pakistan: Challenges Ahead” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 04 March 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

Pakistan faced considerable hurdles both prior to and following its 2024 national elections. Following the elections, the formation of a government was a bit complex and tricky due to a number of reasons including a hung assembly amid allegations of electoral malpractice.  This impasse prolonged political uncertainty as the parties could not agree on a power sharing formula. In the end, external pressure compelled parties to reach a consensus, underscoring the role of non-political entities in shaping political outcomes. These events highlighted the vulnerabilities of Pakistan's democratic framework and governance mechanisms.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Ashok K. Behuria offered a brief overview of recent developments in government formation and political dynamics in Pakistan. He said that contrary to expectations, political engineering resulted in bringing Shebaz Sharif instead of Nawaz Sharif at the front. He also highlighted Punjab’s significant influence on electoral outcomes and its implications for political stability in Pakistan.

Dr. Ashish Shukla began his presentation with Pakistan’s electoral history, marred by allegations of rigging and manipulation. He held that the December 1970 elections were the most free and fair elections in Pakistan’s political history. Speaking of the recent February 2024 election, he argued that the trend of not having a free and fair election continued amidst polarisation and volatility as the key opposition figures faced coercion and were arm-twisted to behave in a particular manner. The return of Nawaz Sharif from exile marked a significant development in domestic politics, and many questioned the way he became re-eligible to contest elections and lead his party. He also underlined the fact that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was denied its election symbol at the last moment leading to all its candidates being treated as independents. Instead of a fair contest among various political parties, the election seemed to have been a battle between PTI’s third-tier leadership and the security establishment. Dr. Shukla also noted that the electoral process lacked its usual vibrancy and enthusiasm, attributed to deliberate targeting of PTI, facilitation of Nawaz Sharif, fear of violence, and security concerns related to persisting terrorist threats.

Voter turnout remained an important indicator of democratic health, reflecting the electorate's engagement in the electoral exercise. Dr. Shukla highlighted that the average voter turnout in Pakistan's last 12 General Elections, including the most recent one, has been around 48.19%. While turnout has varied over the years, with the highest recorded in 1977 and the lowest in 1997, the recent elections witnessed a voter turnout of 47.8 per cent. Further, Dr. Shukla provided an overview of each party's performance in various provinces. The election results showed PTI-independents securing 92 out of 266 available seats nationally, followed by Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N) with 75 seats, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) with 54 seats, and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) with 17 seats. He expressed concern about the growing influence of hardliners like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) in specific regions. Furthermore, he emphasised that despite attempts by the security establishment to limit PTI's impact, PTI and Imran Khan retained their significance, with their numerical vote share increasing alongside PML-N, PPP, and MQM. Dr. Shukla also highlighted the underperformance of religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), while new political entities like PTI-P encountered huge setbacks.

Throwing light on the process of government formation in Pakistan, he noted that no single party secured majority. He assessed that despite attempts by major parties like PTI and PML-N to lead, disagreements persisted, leading to a deadlock in negotiations, particularly between PML-N and PPP. However, a stern warning from the establishment compelled them to reach an agreement, facilitating progress in government formation.

Discussing the challenges before the State, Dr. Shukla said that the new government in Pakistan faces a complex array of challenges on multiple fronts. He said that the external support offered by the PPP weakens the Prime Minister's position, raising doubts about the government's stability and ability to govern effectively. Additionally, disputes over the electoral process have led to protests by the opposition, particularly the PTI, further contributing to political instability. Economic challenges, including high external debt and the need for IMF support, add to the government's woes.

Furthermore, he assessed that internal security concerns are heightened by the resurgence of militant groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), fuelled by developments in neighbouring Afghanistan. Tensions with Afghanistan and the risk of missteps in foreign policy, particularly concerning India, pose significant threats to regional stability. Balancing relations with key players like China and the United States is essential for economic stability and security in Pakistan. Overall, he underlined that the government must navigate these challenges carefully to ensure stability and progress in the country.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, DG, MP-IDSA complimented Dr. Shukla's comprehensive presentation, while emphasising the importance of understanding Pakistan's internal dynamics. Following this, he posed a series of questions and observations regarding the challenges facing the new government. These queries ranged from how the government plans to navigate the complex legal environment to the evolving role of the army in Pakistan's democratic landscape. He also asked about potential initiatives the new government might undertake in its relations with India, considering the need for innovative approaches to regional security.

Additionally, the scholars raised pertinent points about the challenges confronting the new government, behaviour of voters during elections, public perception about the army and Pakistan’s domestic as well as international priorities post- government formation.

Dr. Ashish Shukla responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.

Report prepared by Ms. Sneha M, Research Analyst, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Understanding China and Pakistan ’s UAV Capabilities” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 18 March 2024. The session was moderated by Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. The scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

The presentation provided a comprehensive overview of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs of both China and Pakistan, spanning from their inception to their current known status. It underscored Pakistan’s collaboration with China and Turkey in advancing this technology and its implications for India.It also delved into questions such as why China is emerging as a UAV power and also contemplated on India ’s UAV projects.

Detailed Report

Col. Rajneesh Singh, in his opening remarks, emphasised that the concept of UAVs is not new and has existed for a considerable period. He noted historical instances such as the use of drones for target practices during World War II and unmanned helicopters during the Cold War. Furthermore, he highlighted the democratization of drone development, previously dominated by the US and Israel, which has now become widespread and is operationalised in various conflicts globally. Drones are also increasingly being used by non-state actors for various purposes.

Gp. Capt. Narang shared a brief anecdote of how he was introduced to Pakistan's UAV development programme in 2015 and his follow up research on evolution of Pakistan’s UAV industry from late 1990s. Regarding China, he discussed the role of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) that was established in 1951 as the Bureau of Aviation Industry and renamed AVIC in 2006. Other notable institutions in China ’s UAV landscape include Guizhou Aviation Industry Import/Export Corp (GZAIEC), Xi'an ASN Technology Group Co. Ltd., China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).

China’s drone program commenced with the reverse engineering of Russian La-70 target drone that was undertaken at Weapons Test and Training Base in early 1960s by a team led by Gen. Zhao Xu of Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)’. The Cai Hong-3 (CH-3), an armed UAV manufactured by CASC, was initially showcased in 2008. Subsequently, the CH-4 took its maiden flight in 2011. Notably, the CH-5 (MQ-9 Reaper Class) having a payload capacity of 1200 kilograms made its first flight in 2017. WJ-600, a jet-powered UAV manufactured by CASIC, was first displayed at an airshow in 2010.

Gp. Capt. Narang further elucidated how China ’s UAV R&D followed a trajectory marked by setbacks and extended development timelines. He also emphasized the significant role played by research universities in China, such as Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics (NUAA), Shenyang Aerospace University (SAU), and Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA).

In China, several indigenous UAV programs feature locally developed engines, and there have been efforts to develop supersonic UAVs as well. China is also actively working on miniaturisation of weapons and sensors for UAVs. Furthermore, China has a UAV swarm programme, which included few world record quadcopter UAV swarm displays since 2018. China has exported UAVs to countries like Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Notably, in March 2017, China made an investment of USD 65 billion for establishing the CH-4 UAV manufacturing facility in Saudi Arabia.

Turning to Pakistan, he observed that Pakistan has an established UAV development programme. Its UAV program is a collaborative endeavor involving both Public Sector Units (PSUs) and the Private Sector. The public sector entity, Global Industrial and Defense Solutions (GIDS) played a significant role in developing UAVs such as Uqab, Shahpar, and Huma. The private sector companies like East West Infinity (Pvt) Ltd. and Integrated Dynamics made significant contribution in UAV development. Integrated Dynamics, has exported small civil UAVs to Australia, Spain, South Korea, Libya, and United States border guards since 2006. Pakistan also forged partnerships with countries like Turkey and China to manufacture UAVs.

Moving forward, Gp. Capt. Narang pondered why China is emerging as a UAV power. He observed that the innovation friendly structure of its military, which fosters a scholar warrior culture that supports technological development seems to be one of the major contributors to the growth if its domestic UAV industry. The other technology development friendly initiatives of the People ’s Liberation Army (PLA) include its officers pursuing advanced degrees, establishing a post-doctoral forum on defense technology and PLA personnel leading the technology development projects. He remarked that China ’s and Pakistan ’s UAV programs and collaboration between China, Turkey, and Pakistan on UAVs increases India ’s security and border management challenges.

He also provided a brief overview of India's UAV programs and the challenges they encounter. He discussed challenges leading to closure of India’s UAV programs in the past and uncertainties faced by ongoing UAV development programs. Furthermore, he highlighted how the import of critical components create vulnerabilities and dependencies and how the integration of UAVs remains a challenge.

Questions and Comments

The talk was followed by a Q&A session. Before opening the floor for questions, Col. Singh emphasised that no technology in the world is developed without encountering failure along the way. In response to the question regarding whether Indian UAV programs feature indigenous engines, Gp. Capt. Narang stated that while India has imported engines like Rotax, it possesses the capability to develop indigenous engines. He also stressed the importance of balancing exports and imports, noting that importing numerous systems can incur significant costs.

He emphasised the need for creating consciousness about the importance of Intellectual Property (IP) protection, which has been a weak area. In response to the question about the availability of counter-drone systems in India, he made special mention of contribution of iDEX in developing indigenous solutions. However, he noted that follow up on iDEX initiatives are needed to develop more capable counter drone systems to counter the threat posed by sophisticated drones, especially swarm drones He discussed limitations of Transfer of Technology (TOT) and advocated development of indigenous critical systems.

He also pointed out that indigenously designed, developed and manufactured (IDDM) components are not likely to become commercially viable or cost competitive vis-a-vis global suppliers without supportive IDDM procurement policies. Indian private sector companies have predominantly focused on development of small UAVs. While responding to a question on how Pakistani and Chinese observers view Indian capabilities, he opined that Pakistani observers diligently examine India ’s UAV programmes and Chinese observers tend to downplay Indian capabilities. In his concluding remarks, he said that even though India has the ability to develop UAVs, it has struggled to transform indigenously developed UAVs into operational UAVs due to variables like delays and inconsistencies in allocation and release of  funds, administrative delays, challenges in obtaining timely approvals,  hesitancy in introducing course corrections etc.

Report was prepared by Mr. Rohit K. Sharma, Research Analyst, Strategic Technologies Centre, MP-IDSA.

Mr. Om Prakash Das, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on “Myanmar at Crossroads: Three Years of Coup and Civil War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 26 February 2024. The session was moderated by Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

As the junta regime completes three years in power since the 2021 coup d’état, Myanmar finds itself embroiled in an increasingly destructive civil war. Although armed resistance has taken shape over the years, the country has experienced a significant surge in violence since October 2023. An unprecedented level of strategic coordination between several armed groups has won the rebels 35 towns since the launch of Operation 1027. The position of the junta becomes increasingly tenuous as the Myanmar military incurs loss of troops and territories. The enforcement of the People’s Military Service Law has led to further chaos among the general populace. Large-scale displacement and pervasive violence have precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Influx of civilians and defectors across the porous India-Myanmar border has necessitated a discussion on the future of the Free Movement Regime.

Detailed Report

The session commenced with opening remarks by Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.). Cmde. Singh provided an overview of the current crisis in Myanmar. Myanmar has been in a state of civil war since the overthrow of the civilian government by the Tatmadaw in 2021. Cmde. Abhay acknowledged 27 October 2023 as an inflection point in the democratic struggle of Myanmar. He observed that while the periphery of Myanmar has always been unstable, the core Bamar region is also beginning to see violence. The spread of violence across large swathes of the country has caused massive loss of human lives on both sides of the conflict.

Mr. Om Prakash Das commenced his presentation with a couple of maps aimed at geographically locating Myanmar within the broader region, as well as visualising the 7 politico-administrative divisions and the ethnic composition of the country. Among the 8 major ethnic groups of Myanmar, Bamar are the largest and most dominant ethnolinguistic community. A map visualising the spread of conflict across the country was also presented. The complex nature of territorial control and integrity in Myanmar is demonstrated by the fact that 40-50 percent of the country is currently controlled by various ethnic communities.

Having rejected the legitimacy of National League for Democracy’s victory in the 2020 general elections, the Burmese military launched a coup d'état less than three months later. The military takeover has since been met with widespread civilian and armed resistance, as well as international condemnation. An estimated 6000 civilian deaths have occurred within the initial 20 months of the coup. Latest reports indicate the detention of more than 26,000 Burmese nationals as political prisoners since the military coup. Burmese resistance at the highest level has taken an organised political form through the establishment of the National Unity Government- Myanmar’s government in exile. The NUG coordinates with the People’s Defence Forces (PDF)- an umbrella term for the various local militias that have emerged since the coup.

Mr. Das noted Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in the northern Shan state, as a milestone in the anti-Tatmadaw resistance. Operation 1027 is a coordinated armed rebellion by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), comprising of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). 3BHA’s initial areas of influence were limited to Myanmar’s borders with India, China, and Bangladesh. The Arakan Army has a strong hold over the peripheral state of Rakhine. Several other Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) throughout the country have engaged the military in combat since October 2023. The Karenni Nationalities Defence Forces (KNDF) in the Kayah state, for example, launched Operation 1111 in November 2023. An unprecedented level of coordinated military strategy by the hitherto disparate factions has yielded significant victories for the rebels across two-thirds of the country.  Conversely, defeats at the hands of the armed rebels have led to low morale and weakened unit cohesion among the military troops. Over 14000 soldiers of the Myanmar army have defected since the 2021 coup. 4000 soldiers have reneged since the launch of Operation 1027 alone.

There also exists the case of an unfolding humanitarian crisis. The United Nations figures indicate the displacement of close to 2.6 million people within Myanmar. The civil war has also triggered the emigration of over 8 lakh Burmese nationals. Around 60,000 Burmese nationals are estimated to have taken refuge in India.

The junta government is currently contending with escalating casualties and defections amidst an unpopular war, compelling it to contemplate contentious measures such as mandatory military service to address manpower shortages. However, this initiative entails significant political risks, as evidenced by incidents of backlash among young adults in response to enforced mandatory military service. In this scenario, Mr. Das states that the throne of junta is shaking, as the periphery and southern regions are virtually out of control of the military.

The military strongly believes in a unique national narrative of its crucial guardian role. It employs both ideological loyalty and financial incentives to maintain the dedication of its officers. There had been no significant internal dissent that threatens the stability of Myanmar military until the 2021 coup.

Mr. Das also discussed the contradictions within the anti-junta forces. Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and PDFs have different visions for the future of Myanmar and could face challenges in power-sharing and moderating their respective ideological positions.

After the coup, all the democratic forces came together and tried to structure their aspirations – including ethnic minorities. They published a new Federal Democracy Charter the main objective of which was the removal of the military dictatorship and abolishment of the 2008 constitution which gave the military a political role in the parliament. This charter deals with the questions about how certain issues need to be approached and highlights legal and political considerations to support interim institutions' constitution-building efforts.

Reflecting on India-Myanmar relations, Mr. Das emphasised on the fact that Myanmar has been an important country for India’s Look East, Act East and Neighbourhood First policies. He highlighted that Myanmar is an important member of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, and that Myanmar is India’s gateway to South-East Asia.

He highlighted India’s investments in various infrastructure projects, including the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project that provides an alternative route to the significantly important Siliguri Corridor. Due to the civil war, the area from Sittwe to Paletwa (that falls in the Rakhine state) has now been captured by the Arakan Army. And the area between Paletwa to Mizoram border falls under the Chin State, and thus the project has reached a state of stalemate.

India has displayed a balanced approach towards Myanmar’s junta and to the pro-democratic movement, while officially advocating for the restoration of democracy in the country. India has also engaged with the junta, while creating a delicate balance between supporting democracy while maintaining pragmatic ties with the Junta to secure interest.

Concerning China’s role in Myanmar, Mr. Das said that, the latter is important for China to improve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and for China’s long-term Blue Ocean objective. Myanmar also serves as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for China’s inland province of Sichuan.

The speaker concluded by saying that the probability of the junta regaining its lost territories is very low. The junta, now in a defensive position, is trying to protect the supply routes. Although international actors may push for a negotiated reset, the democratic forces have shown inclination towards negotiating with the military.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General MP-IDSA, complimented Mr. Om Prakash Das for his presentation on a topical issue. He remarked that the international community has long had great expectations of Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi had moved the country towards greater democratic impulses, the United States wanted to normalise relations, and there existed interest in Myanmar’s economy. The air of optimism lasted five to seven years before the country descended into cyclical chaos. Amb. Chinoy identified two facets to the internal instability: The Junta’s difficulty in pacifying the periphery, and the pervasiveness of the PDFs that are engaged in action and counter-action against the junta. China has long had interests across the border. Amb. Chinoy opined that any kind of land connectivity, within the Kaladan multi modal project, is difficult to attain because of the sectional progress and changing situation on ground. He suggested that there may be merit in bypassing Myanmar through maritime routes if the land corridor is deemed infeasible in the finite future. According to Amb. Chinoy, hardening of borders in the last mile areas should be a priority. Identifying the different types of transgressions across the India-Myanmar border, he argued for centre-state government convergence on the future of the Free Movement Regime (FMR).  Amb. Chinoy invited Dr. Pushpita Das to shed some more light on the FMR and the challenges of fencing the border.

The MP-IDSA scholars posed a wide array of questions ranging from the cultural linkages between India and Myanmar to whether the growing unrest in Myanmar would have a bearing on separatist movements in Northeast India. Reference was made to the displacement of Rohingyas. The prospect of an outreach to the local ethnic groups, similar to the Chinese policy, was also discussed.Mr. Om Prakash Das provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars.

Report prepared by Ms. Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.