Nuclear science and technology have impinged upon global politics and security studies for decades. MP-IDSA has focused on the study of the political and strategic facets of nuclear science and technology since its inception and is known for providing a different perspective on global nuclear issues. The Institute has been at the forefront of shaping the debate on key nuclear issues in India and in the world at large. The Centre for Nuclear and Arms Control is dedicated to advance research on strategic nuclear issues. It is engaged in projects that seek to provide answers to relevant policy questions relating to global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and anti-proliferation, nuclear energy, global nuclear governance, regional nuclear dynamics, Arms Trade Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, among others. Through its outreach activities, the Centre has disseminated its research output in the strategic studies and policy communities.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
On 11 May 1998, two events took place:
(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1
India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them.
The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India.
Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), ranging from the Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, is of crucial importance for Europe. However, Europe's interest in the region's maritime space and its security challenges is limited.
The Indo-US nuclear deal not only opened the gates of international nuclear trade for India, but it also showed that India was ready to take its rightful place among the comity of nations as an emerging power. For three long years from 2005 to 2008, the world's strongest and largest democracies were involved in intense diplomatic parleys. At stake in these negotiations was not only the normative order in the form of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), but also the very existence of the ruling political dispensation in India.
everal measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for nuclear security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues.
Rajiv Nayan's article is both important and interesting. It is important because nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity and the planet that in magnitude, severity and immediacy is the gravest of all known risks confronting us today.
By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific.
The announcement of the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” by Australia, UK and US, has prompted discussions on several issues, however, the submarine part of the agreement, about leveraging expertise from US and UK and facilitating the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines, is attracting a lot of attention.
The Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has not succeeded in adding any additional universal stigma to nuclear weapons. It lacks the support base needed for replacing the Cold War vintage “Mutual Assured Destruction” with “Mutual Assured Abstinence”. The nuclear weapon countries’ faith in the deterrence logic remains intact.
Even as nuclear safety protocols and processes have been strengthened since the 1986 disaster, learning from Chernobyl should be a continuing, ongoing process.
India’s decision to reject the NPT was a display of astute statecraft with idealist posturing used to masquerade pursuit of national interests.
As the focus and priority of the international community in recent years have been on averting nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, the nuclear experience of synergising safety and security can be highly useful in combating threats like COVID-19.
Even after five decades of its entry-into-force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is largely seen as a Cold War era instrument that has failed to fulfill the objective of creating a pathway towards a credible disarmament process.
The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.
The Defence Minister’s recent statement on ‘no first use’ basically underlines the fact that India’s current nuclear doctrine is working well.
Nuclear doctrines and postures are dynamic processes that evolve with the security environment. Twenty years after India’s nuclear doctrine was first drafted, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review and suitable revisions.
