The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
More than a decade has passed since the European Union (EU) signed strategic partnerships with China (2003) and India (2004). The EU’s ‘honeymoon’ with China was over within a few years while cooperation on truly strategic issues with India is yet to emerge. The core of both these relationships is still economics.
Within the first year of Xi Jinping’s elevation to the presidency, China has moved further ahead on its path to achieving primacy in the world. In the last week of November 2013, Beijing imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the conflicted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to the consternation of its feuding neighbours such as Japan and South Korea. Their howls of protest found expression in the US attempt to challenge China to promulgate what it has done in deed.
It is a matter of widespread belief that on assumption of supreme power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s overall ambition was to emerge as an iconic figure in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the very outset, Xi realised this would necessitate the elimination of any political challenge and his first step was therefore to consolidate an unassailable position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo (PBSC). To achieve this objective, Xi chose to emulate some of the policies and methods of the late Mao Zedong, albeit with modern underpinnings.
Scholars studying China are quite familiar with themes like national humiliation, nationalism as a new source of regime legitimacy vis-à-vis communism, and China’s anti-US and anti-Japan polemic. Zheng Wang’s book Never Forget National Humiliation captures the interrelated nature of these themes in a skilful manner and is a valuable addition to the study of Chinese nationalism.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalising models, but their import and arrival have posed stiff political challenges for many countries, including China and India, Asia’s two heavyweights. With these two initiatives, the regional trade of Asia is entering an interesting phase of liberalisation and integration.
Since June 2013, there has been a spate of activity on the Tibet controversy. Sparking it off was the interview of Professor Jin Wei1 from the Central Party School in Asian Weekly2 on June 6, entitled ‘Reopen Talks and Resolve Tibetan Issues’, in which she advocated engaging the Dalai Lama rather than demonising him. Soon after, the International Campaign of Tibet reported that China had lifted the 17-year ban on the display of Dalai Lama portraits in Sichuan and Qinghai.
Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.
Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.
Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?
Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:
While the A4 protests in China were a significant development, they may not lead to long-lasting socio-political changes
US–China relations have become increasingly contentious due to a variety of issues spanning trade and economics to military and geopolitical concerns.
Science diplomacy can be used effectively to address critical challenges facing the South Asian region.
The efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure will depend on the member-states’ ability to focus on countering terrorism concerns while managing their divergent regional interests.
The Indian media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and of Xi Jinping’s third term.
The growing insecurity and threat perceptions articulated in the 20th Party Congress Work Report by Chinese President Xi Jinping indicates that Beijing is likely to become more assertive and belligerent in its international dealings.
China is making increasing use of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), among others, to modernise the People’s Liberation Army.
The PLA Western Theatre Command has focused on joint operations capabilities to counter the perceived lack of air superiority and information dominance in the theatre, which it believes is required for strike operations.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has established a leadership and command system to enhance its capability to conduct joint operations.
Several Belt and Road Initiative projects pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.
