Making FDI Count in Defence
It is rare that a foreign company makes a huge investment to produce major platforms in a third country with a view to make that country an export hub.
- Laxman Kumar Behera
- June 22, 2016
India spends a significant amount of resources on its national defence. Efficiency in utilisation of resources is not only an economic imperative but vital for defence preparedness. In view of this, the Defence Economics and Industry Centre was created in 2006 to promote research on various economic aspects of India’s defence. Since its inception, the Centre has undertaken a number of policy relevant studies besides constantly engaging vital stakeholders (Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces and Industry) on a range of issues. The major focus areas of the Centre are:
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
It is rare that a foreign company makes a huge investment to produce major platforms in a third country with a view to make that country an export hub.
Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.
While it may be tempting for the Niti Aayog to make deep inroads into defence planning, it would be wise to focus only on those areas that do not disturb the core function of defence preparedness.
If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?
The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.
‘Transfer of Technology’ does not magically elevate defence production capabilities to cutting-edge levels and help attain future self-reliance because technology sellers employ restrictive trade practices to prevent such an eventuality.
Introduction of the ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement category, the revamped ‘Make’ procedure, structural change in AAP, and higher and flexible indigenous content requirement in certain procurement categories are all likely to deepen the involvement of domestic industry in defence production.
Defence planning has had a troubled history since its inception, in spite of several experiments with the structures and processes of planning. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to re-evaluate the existing architecture of planning.
Rather than continuing to harp on issues like inadequacy of defence outlays, the committee could actually bring about a tangible improvement in the state of defence preparedness by focusing on four specific micro areas.
The best of policies and procedures can come to naught because of indecisiveness in decision-making. There is little in DPP 2016 that addresses the problems which beset decision-making in the MoD.