Dr. P.K. Pradhan, Research Fellow, spoke on “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Agreement: Implications for India” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 October 2025. Dr. Priyanka Singh, Associate Fellow, moderated the meeting. Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the discussion.

Executive Summary

The presentation offered a detailed analysis of the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed on 17 September 2025 marking a deepening of long-standing military cooperation and reflecting Riyadh’s bid to diversify security partnerships amid regional volatility. The deal underscores shifting Gulf alignments, revived Pakistan-US ties, and emerging multipolar security dynamics in West Asia. The discussion focused on the implications of the defence deal for India.

Detailed Report

In her opening remarks, Dr. Priyanka Singh provided an overview of the recently concluded Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA), underscoring Pakistan’s long-standing military presence in the Kingdom and its nuclear capabilities. Dr. Singh highlighted the potential for a calibrated outsourcing of nuclear technology to Riyadh, particularly in the wake of Israel’s airstrikes in Qatar, which have altered the Gulf region’s security calculus. Dr. Singh noted that Pakistan’s renewed relevance within the US strategic framework, particularly after Operation Sindoor, warrants an examination of Washington’s motives in supporting the deal.

Dr. Pradhan elaborated on the agreement’s provisions, noting its emphasis on a shared commitment by both states to enhance their security and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression. The pact stipulates that any act of aggression against one state shall be considered an aggression against both, signaling an expansion of defence cooperation beyond conventional means. While explicit reference to nuclear collaboration is absent, the SDMA’s comprehensive nature implies inclusion of missile and nuclear defence components. Dr. Pradhan opined that the agreement can be seen as a formalisation and institutionalisation of the long-standing military partnership between Riyadh and Islamabad.

The speaker noted that since the 1960s, Pakistan has been a critical security partner for Saudi Arabia. Both countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in 1967. Pakistani pilots flew Saudi aircraft and provided training to Saudi military forces. In return, Pakistan has received huge financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. Following the 1970s oil boom, Saudi financial support to Pakistan increased substantially. In 1982, both countries signed a protocol agreement on deputation of armed forces and approximately 15,000 Pakistani military personnel in Saudi Arabia. This defence cooperation deepened over subsequent decades, extending to joint exercises, defence industrial cooperation, and deployment of around 6,000 Pakistani troops during the 1990–91 Gulf War as well as after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US.

Dr. Pradhan mentioned that there is huge speculation that Saudi Arabia has provided financial support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, though neither of these countries has declared it officially. Visits by senior Saudi leaders, including Crown Prince Abdullah (1998) and Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz (1999, 2002) to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities signalled Riyadh’s interest in Islamabad’s nuclear weapons.

Dr. Pradhan observed that Pakistan’s neutral stance during the Arab Spring strained its ties with Saudi Arabia temporarily, as Saudi Arabia expected Islamabad’s active support to suppress anti-monarchy protests in Bahrain. Pakistan declined direct intervention but permitted private recruitment of Pakistani nationals to reinforce Saudi security forces. Similarly, Islamabad refrained from direct military involvement in the Yemeni conflict (2015), pledging instead to defend Saudi territorial integrity and the sanctity of the two holy mosques. The appointment of Gen. Raheel Sharif as commander of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) in 2017 reaffirmed Riyadh’s trust in Pakistan’s military leadership.

Dr. Pradhan noted that Israel’s recent airstrikes in Qatar targeting the Hamas leaders was a key catalyst behind the new agreement, prompting Saudi Arabia to diversify its defence partnerships and reduce dependence on the US. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, military experience and defence ties with China make it an attractive strategic partner for Riyadh amid shifting regional power dynamics. Pakistan, for its part, has effectively leveraged its narrative of nuclear deterrence and missile prowess, particularly following Operation Sindoor. Saudi Foreign Minister’s visits to New Delhi and Islamabad during the tensions display Riyadh’s interest in de-escalating the conflict.

Dr. Pradhan said that the US support for Israel’s air strike in Qatar, has generated unease in Riyadh about Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor. Meanwhile, the US-Pakistan engagement has deepened as President Donald Trump has expressed interest in regaining American control over the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.

According to Dr. Pradhan, for Saudi Arabia, the SDMA serves to mitigate vulnerabilities arising from internal security challenges, hostilities with Houthis, rivalry with Iran, and the expanding footprint of Israel’s military activities in the Gulf. The agreement is mutually beneficial: Pakistan, despite its fragile economy, possesses robust military capabilities and remains the only Muslim-majority state with nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia, despite high defence spending has a weak army and faces multiple security challenges. The pact should not be construed as Riyadh choosing Islamabad over New Delhi. Saudi Arabia’s strong economic engagement with India — bilateral trade exceeding US$ 41 billion, with Saudi investments in India around US$3.2 billion and Indian investments in the Kingdom approximating US$3 billion — reflect a pragmatic balance in Riyadh’s approach. India is a key market for Saudi oil. Besides, both have elevated their ties to a strategic level.

Dr. Pradhan further stated that, Saudi Arabia’s post-2001 shift from its pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir, now supporting bilateral resolution consistent with India’s position, reinforces this balancing act. Consequently, Saudi military intervention in any India-Pakistan conflict appears highly improbable. Riyadh has historically refrained from participating in combat operations beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Thus, the defence deal primarily represents asymmetric cooperation—military support from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia—rather than an alliance aimed against a third party.

Nonetheless, the SDMA presents new strategic challenges for Pakistan, especially in terms of Pakistan’s involvement in maritime security in the Arabian Sea, participation in Saudi internal security, and refusal of Saudi requests for military support. Regionally, the pact’s implications for the US security architecture in the Gulf warrant careful scrutiny. Iran supports the agreement as it could signal the emergence of an alternative regional security framework that may diminish US influence.

The Indian Government has stated that it will study the implications of the Saudi-Pakistan agreement for India’s national security as well as for regional and global stability. From India’s perspective, the SDMA is a strategic concern rather than an immediate security threat. The agreement represents a diplomatic setback for India. New Delhi needs to intensify engagement with Riyadh to preserve its strategic and economic interests. Saudi Arabia, aware of its economic interdependence with India, is unlikely to jeopardise its partnership with New Delhi.

Q & A Session

In the discussion that followed during the Q&A session, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy emphasised the enduring and multifaceted nature of Saudi–Pakistani ties, recalling Pakistan’s assistance during the 1979 Mecca incident. He noted that while Pakistan’s military strategy vis-à-vis India remains unpredictable and potentially reactive to terrorism-related triggers, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to intervene in any ensuing conflict. Riyadh’s primary regional competitors — Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Houthi-led Yemen — continue to shape its strategic priorities, with limited scope for Pakistan’s direct involvement in Saudi Arabia’s regional confrontations. Amb. Chinoy noted that Saudi Arabia cannot feasibly procure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, given international scrutiny and logistical constraints. He recommended that India further consolidate ties with Riyadh, enhancing strategic dialogue and economic interdependence. The discussion also touched upon the US’ role in the deal, the possibility of formation of an “Islamic NATO” and China’s dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s intelligence-sharing activities with the US.

Report pepared by Dr. Hirak Jyoti Das, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, New Delhi.