On 18 August 2025, Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre, delivered a talk during the Monday Morning Meeting on “Headwinds in the Taiwan Strait: A View from Taipei”. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Abhishek K. Darbey, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute actively participated in the discussions.

Executive summary

Relations between China and the self-ruled island of Taiwan have attracted much attention in international circles in recent years. While Chinese President Xi Jinping continues to espouse the inevitability of ‘peaceful reunification’, Taiwan under its leader Lai Ching-te continues to take steps that China construes as provocative and leaning towards Taiwan’s ‘independence’. Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh undertook a survey of Taiwan’s current political and security landscape. He argued that Lai and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), are engaged in a quest to redefine the island’s identity in a way that has attracted the ire of Beijing and that may not be without implications for its domestic politics and society. He noted that the recent internal political churn in Taipei has brought the general resilience of Taiwan’s democratic system under the scanner. He maintained that the political constellation in Taipei not only impacts cross-Strait ties but could have some impact for US-Taiwan ties as well. On the security front, he showed that a section of Taiwanese analysts is pessimistic and views China deciding to take action for ‘reunification’ as a foregone conclusion, though they do not agree on the timing. At the same time, they differ from Western analysts by arguing for an all-out attack by Beijing’s forces.   

Detailed report

Dr. Darbey commenced the meeting with a brief overview of the issues between China and Taiwan. Recounting the three Taiwan Strait Crises, he noted that in recent times three interrelated factors have become relevant to the current state of affairs. The first factor is the continued emphasis by President Xi Jinping’s administration on a ‘peaceful reunification’ of Taiwan with China, failing which all means at its disposal would be utilised. On the other hand, the incumbent administration of Lai Ching-te and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has in recent times taken actions that Beijing construes as leaning towards ‘independence’ of Taiwan. The final factor is the population of Taiwan, which is caught between these two opposing forces but wants to maintain the status quo. These three factors, according to Dr. Darbey, interact to influence not only domestic politics, but also Taiwan’s relations with the other superpower, the United States of America. With this backdrop in mind, he requested Dr. P.K. Singh to present his thoughts.

At the outset, Dr. Singh explained that the content of his remarks would be based on his experience of Taiwanese society after a recent four-month stay there, and that some of his arguments would revisit his published material concerning this period. He also noted that his remarks would also incorporate impressions gleaned during his field-trip and his interactions with local interlocutors.

Surveying the recent state of cross-Strait relations, Dr. Singh argued that until 2022, tensions in the Taiwan Strait had by and large persisted at a low level. However, then-US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 proved a turning point in cross-Strait relations, as did the subsequent rise of Lai Ching-te in Taipei. At present, the Speaker noted, China is conducting a series of military exercises in the region surrounding Taiwan, and grey zone activities (such as the severing of cables between Taiwan and the outlying island of Jinmen) have picked up pace. While business-to-business ties continue, other forms of people-to-people contact, particularly academic and cultural contacts, have suffered.

Turning to domestic policy changes, Dr. Singh noted the transformative impact of Lai Ching-te by differentiating his approach from predecessors such as Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. Though they came from the same DPP that Lai belongs to, which is widely perceived as having pro-‘independence’ proclivities, they nevertheless engaged in the question of the nature of cross-Strait relations, albeit in their own way. However, Lai, who has emerged out of the political rank-and-file of the DPP, demonstrates a rigid stance on this issue. This is evident from his repeated references to ‘Taiwan’ in a way that purports to accentuate its separateness from Mainland China and parity with it, coupled with expunging ‘Han Chinese’ as a distinct ethnic marker from the demographic profile of the Executive Yuan’s website. Such moves, Dr. Singh noted, may not resonate with the Taiwanese society.

According to Dr. Singh, another Lai-era policy initiative that has been viewed with some concern is his characterisation of China as a ‘hostile external threat’. The recent listing of 17 strategies to combat what it perceives as ‘red infiltration’ are, according to Dr. Singh, a sign of viewing the mainland through an exclusive security lens. Though he showed some understanding towards reasonable measures taken by Lai’s administration to clarify ‘citizenship’ requirements and maintain the sanctity and dignity of ‘citizenship’, he nevertheless argued that the line between ‘permissible’ and ‘impermissible’ contacts with the mainland was difficult to clarify, with ample scope for overreach. Thus, apprehensions regarding the rule of law and freedom in Taiwan have a basis in fact, especially given the ruling party’s aggressive approach towards the political opposition.

Dr. Singh then informed the audience that the opposition has taken up cudgels to protect itself. Tracing the roots of this confrontation to the January 2024 election of Lai, he highlighted several key attempts by the opposition to undercut the administration’s quest for unanimity in its policy towards China. He related details of legislative moves by opposition parties, who dominate the Legislative Yuan, to criminalise contempt for its decisions, an overreach that was swiftly overthrown by the judiciary. A later, more successful, move was the revision of three key laws governing judicial procedure, budgetary allocation and election of public officials.

In response, Dr. Singh revealed, the DPP triggered the limited power available to it under Taiwan’s governing constitution. This would metamorphose into the ‘recall movement’, whereby legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) would effectively be recalled by a public vote of no-confidence. However, in a vote held on 26 July 2025, 24 of 31 legislators slated for recall survived the challenge unscathed, with a later round of voting for 7 legislators on 23 August expected to return the same results. Dr. Singh characterised these results as a vindication of Taiwan’s democratic resilience and as a sign of Taiwanese people’s preference for the status quo.

Giving an overview of Taiwan’s defence preparedness, the Speaker noted that the administration was motivated by a sense of ‘imminent threat’, which a significant section of Taiwan’s population has given some support to. Briefly outlining steps such as the lengthening of conscription periods and the cultivation of whole-of-society resilience, he informed the audience that during his recent visit a greater number of clearly-marked air defence shelters were visible, which he interpreted as signs of preparedness. However, he was sceptical about the effectiveness of increasing pools of reserve service persons. He also flagged the state of advancement in critical military technology like drone technology, where Taiwan has a lot of ground to cover before it possessed effective drone capabilities.

Concerning the probability of a Chinese invasion, Dr. Singh assured the audience that the lion’s share of experts he had interacted with did not perceive an impending invasion, though a section of them were quite pessimistic as to the long-term future of the island. These experts believe that while Taiwan could resist preliminary waves of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), successive waves of attackers willing to accept high casualty rates would wear down Taiwan’s defences should the latter be deprived of external support. Others believe that China does not have the necessary capabilities to effect a forcible takeover and place faith in the deterrent effect of economic sanctions and political isolation to influence Chinese policymakers. He also shed light on an interesting fact, namely, that the Taiwanese do not subscribe to the much-touted ‘piecemeal’ escalation often propagated by Western sources. Instead, they believe that any invasion attempt by Beijing would seek to capture the entire country in one go, perhaps through the well-disguised ruse of a ‘military exercise’.

Offering his views on US involvement, the Speaker pointed out that continued US commitment to Taipei’s security remains the working assumption, though scepticism regarding the intentions of President Donald Trump remains. Taiwanese analysts, he related, are quite bemused by President Trump’s treatment of traditional Asian allies. The US president’s ‘tariff war’ on Taiwanese exports has attracted concern, especially as it is accompanied by a significantly-appreciated Taiwan Dollar. Meanwhile, the increasing pressure on semiconductor manufacturers to ‘Make in America’ has also given rise to fears of a hollowing-out of Taiwan’s ‘Silicon Shield’, which many in Taipei believe keeps them strategically relevant to Washington. It is also seen as the US’ desire to move strategic assets out of Taiwan.

The Speaker in his conclusion expressed uncertainty about whether China’s moves in the Taiwan Strait represented deterrence or compellence. He argued that Beijing had successfully restricted Taipei’s room for manoeuvre in the international space, which has probably led the latter to fall into domestic ‘cacophony’. He apprehended that Taiwan’s increased internal political turbulence could unwittingly cause sections of the political forces there to violate China’s ‘red lines’ and trigger unwarranted Chinese intervention in unforeseen ways. US policy towards the region could also see a recalibration in the coming days, which in turn could impact matters in the Strait.

Comments and questions

Expressing his appreciation for the Speaker’s incisive presentation, Dr. Darbey requested the Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, to deliver his remarks on the arguments presented. Amb. Chinoy, congratulating the Speaker for his comprehensive presentation on the current state of Taiwanese politics and security, noted that Beijing’s preference for the KMT seemed quite clear, as the DPP’s actions presented a significant risk of rolling back gains made by the KMT in cross-Strait ties. As such, it is only natural that public discontent is rising. Agreeing with the Speaker’s assessment Amb. Chinoy urged scholars to keep a close eye on the actions of the other superpower, the US, especially under President Trump.

Though the failure to follow through on commitments to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression would mark the end of a sustainable US posture in the Asia-Pacific and sow doubt regarding US intentions among long-standing allies such as Japan and South Korea, Amb. Chinoy sought the Speaker’s opinion on the possibility that President Trump, frustrated by the immovable obstacles facing his attempts to claim credit for resolving the Ukraine conflict and India-Pakistan tensions, may choose to involve himself in dealmaking with China on the Taiwan issue. The Speaker concurred with this assessment, adding that Taiwanese analysts too believe that US-China and US-Taiwan relations may witness changes in the times to come, though they do not foresee US abandonment yet. China’s military moves primarily serve a deterrent purpose, and if mutual accommodation between the US and China is reached, along with a political change tolerable to Beijing within Taiwan in the coming years, tensions in the Taiwan Strait may subside.

Amb. Chinoy then queried whether Taiwan’s quest to seek membership of international organisations at a time when President Trump is mulling US withdrawal from the same would be conducive to the improvement of US-Taiwan relations. Dr. Singh replied that Taiwan’s presence is not expected to increase in the days to come, but there may be limited acceptance by Beijing of some limited presence being retained by Taipei should forces more amenable to abiding by the 1992 Consensus, in other words, the “One China principle, with respective interpretations”, comes to power in Taipei.

Dr. Anand Kumar wished to understand the US interest in modulating cross-Strait relations, especially given the context that Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022 may have been driven by personal political motives.  Dr. Singh replied that the US by and large would like that the level of tension in the Strait is manageable and does not spill over into open conflict.

This report was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre.