Ms. Simran Walia, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (MP-IDSA), delivered a presentation on “Japan’s Official Security Assistance Policy towards Southeast Asia” during the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 July 2025. Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst at MP-IDSA, moderated the session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General of MP-IDSA, attended the meeting along with scholars from the Institute.

Executive Summary

The session analysed the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy post-World War II, particularly the advent of its Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme directed at Southeast Asian nations. Ms Walia examined the transformation of Japan from an imperial power to a trusted economic partner in the region. The shift was significantly influenced by the Fukuda doctrine of 1977. She underscored the establishment of the OSA in 2023, marking a significant reorientation in Japan’s foreign policy, fuelled by China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. OSA is designed as a non-lethal aid initiative that aims to bolster the defence capabilities of recipient countries. The subsequent discussion delved into the implications of Japan’s domestic political shifts, the challenges to ASEAN’s cohesion, the OSA effectiveness, its future trajectory, its role in the region, and its relevance for the India-Japan defence partnership.

Detailed Reported

Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, the moderator, started the session by providing the Japanese historical context. He underscored the significance of the meeting occurring on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the legacy of the Japanese imperial expansion, which left a profound impact on Southeast Asian nations. These nations felt apprehension towards Japan, and its economic resurgence met with protest, which led to a strategic policy adjustment. This was the reason for the promulgation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977, which laid the base for Japan’s commitment to renouncing its military power, and led to a trustworthy regional relationship with ASEAN. Dr. Dasgupta also reiterated that this trust has also facilitated the reengagement in security matters, primarily through the Japanese Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme, which was conceptualised in 2023. The OSA initiative complements the long-standing official development assistance (ODA) programme. It is mainly a response to China’s increased assertiveness and the USA’s recent pullback from the Indo-Pacific region.

Ms. Simran Walia presented her analysis and outlined Japan’s adherence to a pacifist constitution, mainly its Article 9, which prohibits the country from using force to resolve international disputes. Article 9 and its legal framework were crucial in historically guiding Japan’s foreign policy toward economic diplomacy and non-military engagement through the ODA. However, increasing coercive actions by China in the region have compelled Japan to reexamine its security stance. This reassessment led to significant policy and institutional reforms, such as the establishment of Japan’s National Security Council in 2013 and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution in July 2014, which permitted the country to adopt a policy of collective self-defence and the comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2022.

Ms. Walia noted that the OSA initiative was first proposed in the revised NSS, which was formally adopted in April 2023, distinguishing the OSA from the ODA. OSA primarily aims to enhance the military defence capabilities of the ODA recipient countries exclusively for non-lethal purposes like maritime surveillance, cybersecurity, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). This initiative underlines its departure from its historical reluctance to provide security-related aid and reflects the growing consensus that development and security are interlinked. OSA funding has substantially increased in recent years from 13.8 million USD in 2023 to 56 million USD projected for the 2025 fiscal year.

Ms. Walia assessed that OSA’s strategic and geopolitical implications are far-reaching because it redefines Japan’s post-Second World War identity, transforming the country from a purely aid-providing nation to a practical security provider. This has allowed Japan to expand its regional strategic footprint without formal alliances. Secondly, the OSA initiative’s primary strategic goal is to provide Southeast Asian countries with a viable substitute in place of China’s Belt and Road infrastructure assistance initiative (BRI), which will increase the dependencies of these countries on China. Japan’s OSA provides a transparent and rule-based engagement model in contrast to China’s initiative. Thirdly, OSA also harmonises with the United States-Japan alliance, encouraging Japan to assume greater responsibility for regional security. OSA is crucial in addressing aggression and upholding the freedom of navigation in the region. It has helped strengthen the capabilities of like-minded Southeast Asian countries and by complementing multilateral frameworks like the QUAD.  Over time, OSA will play a critical role in shaping the region’s informal security architecture and increasing the trust between Japan and the Southeast Asian nations.

Ms. Walia also discussed that the OSA faces several challenges despite its strategic promises because Japan’s pacifist constitution continues to limit the scope of its military engagement. While OSA simultaneously avoids the direct provision of lethal weaponry, the significant difference between the non-lethal security assistance and militarisation can be ambiguous and further inflame the domestic debate. Also, Japan’s increasing security role, namely in disputed maritime zones, will likely increase the risk of mending ties with China, which sees these moves as a containment strategy or coercive threat by the broader US-Japan engagement in the region. Another critical challenge is the strict emphasis of the OSA’s non-lethal aid based on surveillance equipment and training, which will restrict the impact of operations compared to other significant military assistance programs operated by other countries. Ms. Walia analysed that providing security equipment may not suffice in addressing interstate hostilities in the region. She also underscored that the value of the OSA initiative endures despite these limitations. Japan’s decades of engagement in the Southeast Asian region have demonstrated that its more measured approach to security has cemented its position as the preferred and secure partner.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, delivered his remarks on the presentation before the Q&A session by drawing from his experience as former Ambassador to Japan. He reiterated Japan’s historical reluctance to adopt a military posture and the inherent challenges in altering this stance. He underscored that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had initiated significant reforms in the security sector, such as the formation of the National Security Council and the review and evaluation of collective security guidelines. Ambassador Chinoy questioned the overall effectiveness of OSA towards contributing to the security of the Southeast Asian region. As regards the India-Japan Partnership, Ambassador Chinoy asserted that India is seeking a more equal partnership with Japan, which goes beyond donor-recipient relationships.

During the question-and-answer session, Ms. Anushka Chavan, Intern, asked about  Bangladesh-China relations under Mohammad Yunus and how they influence Japan’s security strategy towards   Bangladesh. Ms. Walia responded that Bangladesh is a recipient of OSA, and Japan is helping Bangladesh with its economic and infrastructure development as a developing country. However, in the current scenario, Bangladesh is turning towards China, and the hostility between Japan and China will surely affect Japan’s OSA stance on Bangladesh.

Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan, Associate Fellow, inquired about Japan’s stand on Taiwan. Ms. Walia responded that Taiwan does not receive Japan’s OSA because it is not an internationally recognised state. It does not fulfil the minimum necessary qualifications for obtaining an OSA. In future, if China ever tries to invade Taiwan, Japan will support the US in defending Taiwan.

In response to queries posed by the Moderator, Ms. Walia underscored the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) recent loss of majority in the upper house election of the National Diet. She then mentioned the emergence of parties like the Sanseito party, which advocates the increase in Japanese defence spending to 3 -3.5 per cent of the GDP, and the party also opposes the presence of US troops in Japan.

Ms. Walia responded to another query by the Moderator, by stating that the recent military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not directly impact the OSA initiative, but will push Japan’s departure from its historically pacifist stance. She also recognised the dilemma faced by the Southeast Asian countries in the region, which would need to balance trade relations with China against receiving the OSA from Japan, pointing towards the need for strategic navigation.

Report has been prepared by Mr. Athul T. Dharan, Intern, East Asia Centre.