India-China War

China’s Wars and Strategies: Looking Back at the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War

This article explores China’s war experiences in the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War and analyses China’s strategic decisions at the time of its national establishment. This article suggests that China pursued the strategic goal of protecting its frontiers and ensuring its territorial integrity in both wars, while executing dissimilar strategies. The article associates the modernisation of People’s Liberation Army after the Korean War with the outcome of the following war with India.

1962: The War That Wasn’t, by Kunal Verma

The title of the book is self-explanatory. And the tone and tenor thereof is an implied challenge to the conventional wisdom, and thesis, propounded in India’s China War, written by British scribe Neville Maxwell in the 1970s. According to Verma, in 1949, ‘China was not a player as far as India’s national security was concerned.’ None, except Sardar Patel, could read, or anticipate, China and its plan of action. Hence, the 1962 India–China conflict is ‘least understood’. Exactly a month before his death, however, Patel wrote a warning letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru.

Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change

  • Publisher: Pentagon Press

Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenges. This challenges is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioner and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted.

  • ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1,
  • Price: ₹ 795
  • E-copy available

The Two Myths of 1962

In the ongoing debate on the 1962 War, two issues have not been adequately addressed: the myth that the Indian Army had not provided viable military options, and the reasons for the non-use of the combat potential of the Indian Air Force.