The current predicament the Military finds itself in can be used constructively by the Services and the government for undertaking the necessary correctives with a sense of urgency and obligation.
Non-articulation of India's strategic doctrine lends it to be interpreted and perceived variously. India's security establishment need not be defensive about its strategic doctrine but boldly take on critics in the strategic community. Besides, its articulation would help provide direction to the military in their formulation of military doctrine, planning and acquisitions.
The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand.
Continued engagement with LOAC and IHL is ongoing with the Judge Advocates General Department taking the primary role. Its training institution in Kamptee is at the forefront. There has been increased interaction with the ICRC since India opened up to the ICRC in the mid nineties, after initially being defensive with respect to Kashmir. Not only has IHL been introduced into officer and subordinate ranks courses, but guest lectures are also organised. Increased scope of the engagement is possible, particularly if it finds mention in the next edition of the Army doctrine.
The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.
This paper suggests an approach towards building conditions necessary for peace between India and Pakistan. Identifying the Pakistani army as a power centre in Pakistan, the hypothesis is that a strategic dialogue with it would achieve doctrinal balancing and help mitigate its threat perception.
The Services have been doctrinally fecund over the past decade, with each Service bidding to pursue relatively distinct campaigns, which would amount to lack of synergy and the whole failing to rise higher than the sum of its parts.
In the wake of Director General IDSA’s initiation of a debate on civil-military relations through his piece in the Indian Express of 9 July 2010, this Comment outlines the two major positions in the debate.
A strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan at the level of NSAs, assisted by representatives of the national security establishment including the military on both sides, needs to be initiated to address core questions like the strategic balance and reconciling strategic doctrines.
The Third Front: Military Ethics
The current predicament the Military finds itself in can be used constructively by the Services and the government for undertaking the necessary correctives with a sense of urgency and obligation.