Since 1947, the protracted issue of Kashmir has predominantly underpinned the subcontinent’s security discourse having dictated the trajectory of unsettling ties between India and Pakistan. As old as India’s independence from British rule and the consequent creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir issue is rooted in the indecisive phase preceding Jammu and Kashmir’s (J&K) formal accession to India.
Isolated statements from China and Pakistan soliciting India’s participation in CPEC could be part of a strategic mind-game. India must consider engaging astutely in this mind-game.
India must avoid policy incoherence and inconsistency on PoK that has spanned decades, and navigate a course that helps reshape the domestic as well as external discourses on PoK and pursue Indian claims in a firm, consistent manner.
India needs to proactively buttress its broader position by affixing/prefixing the issue of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the bilateral agenda every time the issue of Kashmir comes up for discussion.
Gilgit Baltistan’s absorption may signal a paradigmatic shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy. However, Pakistan would have to reset the contours of its position on Kashmir including an implied acceptance of the status quo.
While China’s initial reluctance was attributed to the sheer scale of the project, costing tens of billions of dollars, in the changed CPEC-helmed geo-economic-strategic context, its re-calculations cannot be ruled out.
This book collates a wide spectrum of views across South Asia, including Myanmar, and debates the role of media in forging regional understanding and goodwill. The media's role in South Asia is essentially conceived as state-centric, adhering to the standard templates of nationalism. This inherent tendency has, at times, cost neutral and balanced coverage of events and issues. The contributors to this volume acknowledge the potential of the media as an institution which could/should, in addition to its routine reportage, focus on regional issues of common interest and promote regional understanding.
Chinese stakes in Gilgit Baltistan could propel Pakistan to introduce a stop gap provincial arrangement that would contain popular resistance, promote greater stability, and deflate India’s objections to CPEC.
India has to take a call on whether it would like to be a party to the CPEC, sit on the fence, or convey its concerns more emphatically in a bid to discourage China.
Inserting PoK into the Kashmir Conundrum
India needs to proactively buttress its broader position by affixing/prefixing the issue of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the bilateral agenda every time the issue of Kashmir comes up for discussion.