Bangladesh’s relations with India are multi-dimensional - ideological, political and also economic. An extreme sense of distrust, insecurity and perceived domination by India has shaped Bangladesh’s foreign policy in recent years. It at the same time, hesitant and finds it uncomfortable to function within a bilateral parameter. Whether it is trade, export of gas, provision of transit or the water issue, Bangladesh has argued for multilateral arrangements.

In recent years, Africa has emerged as a hot spot for energy sources. The reopening of the oil sector in Sudan and the oil discoveries in West and Central Africa has made this possible. There is a growing argument that oil breeds instability in the African and other oil-rich developing countries across the world. While oil wealth has led to an increase in conflicts in Africa, particularly in the case of Sudan and Nigeria, the rising energy demand is pushing major US, European, Chinese and Malaysian oil companies to invest in African oil.

The end of the Cold War witnessed a realignment of equations amongst states to adapt to the changed world order. Within its ‘Look East’ policy, India initiated an economic engagement with its extended eastern neighbourhood to generate political trust and eventually forge multifaceted bonds. Due to the salience of Southeast Asia in geo-strategic terms, cooperation among maritime security forces has lately become imperative to respond to transnational security threats and realise common politico-strategic objectives.

This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric.

Before and during World War II, India was one of the many territorial commands of the British imperial defence system. When India became independent, the country was totally reliant on Britain for its armaments for the three services. There was some left over equipment of the US armed forces from the World War II period – Dakota aircraft, some Sherman tanks and transport vehicles.

The conceptual discourse, contributed to in the main by Western scholars, on the security and strategic stability of new nuclear weapon states like India and Pakistan seems alarmist. In reality, however, India and Pakistan have been mutually deliberating on various aspects of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). This article is an effort to identify the issues of nuclear security concerns in two spheres – academic and policy formulations. The emphasis is more on the nuclear thinking of the two countries and the diplomatic challenges ahead particularly on the nuclear CBMs.

An attempt has been made in this article to assess the arguments in favour of a fundamental shift in Indo-US relations by revisiting the history of their bilateral relations since its formative period and comparing it with the present period. The paper strongly argues that the Indian decision to go nuclear in May 1998 played a catalytic role in bringing the two democracies together. It was Shakti 1998, which changed the entire scenario and augmented for a changed US policy towards South Asia, especially towards India.

In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.