The future of an organization is less determined by outside forces than by its history and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is no exception. This article analyses the major achievements and shortfalls of the DRDO. It models the strategic dimensions of organization development. The value of production from defence industries arising from DRDO technology transfers is rapidly escalating, enabling the government’s goal of self-reliance.
Though public-private partnerships is encouraged, privately the government continues to retain its monopoly on research and development and defence production through the DRDO, the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs.
The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.
To say that DRDO scientists have no right to think or pass judgements over strategic doctrines may be correct in terms of policy requirements but is certainly not rich academically.
Managing India’s Missile Aspirations
The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.