If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?

The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.

Defence planning has had a troubled history since its inception, in spite of several experiments with the structures and processes of planning. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to re-evaluate the existing architecture of planning.

The best of policies and procedures can come to naught because of indecisiveness in decision-making. There is little in DPP 2016 that addresses the problems which beset decision-making in the MoD.

While taking stock of the acquisition proposals and projects is critical for bringing in efficiency in defence procurements, the focus on statistics dissembles some important issues.

The Defence Acquisition Council has decided to introduce a new category of Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured equipment. This will be the most preferred category, ahead of ‘Buy (Indian)’, which presently occupies the pride of place.

The MoD guidelines on handling of complaints do not seem to be free from potentially crippling afflictions. Conceptual ambiguity can easily defeat the purpose of the guidelines.

Recommendations that defence procurement be handled by the military brass, ministers stay out of defence deals, and an external procurement agency be set up to handle procurement and focus on indigenization are indeed extraordinary.