Efforts undertaken to address concerns generated by the Iranian nuclear issue have primarily followed a dual-track approach made up of punitive non-proliferation and economic sanctions at the multi-lateral and unilateral levels and diplomatic-political engagement across the bilateral, tri-lateral and multi-lateral spectrum. These have, however, not been successful in ‘forcing’ cooperation from Iran on core issues of concern, including in such activities as the stopping of uranium enrichment activities.

The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India.

The India–China nuclear-strategic relationship has been surprisingly under studied, given the rising interest in the strategic interaction between the two countries. 1 Part of the reason is that India's nuclear capabilities have been relatively limited vis-à-vis China, though this is exaggerated by the tendency among Indian analysts to focus on the need to target Beijing. There is no evident reason why China should not be deterred by the targeting of other cities that are closer to India.