Turkey is facing serious challenges in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its response to the conflict could have far-reaching implications for its struggling economy, damaged relations with the US and EU, its complex partnership with Russia, and for the regional security architecture in the Black Sea.

Cyberconflict in Ukraine has become normalised in that it is focused, there is no lasting damage, and it effectively conveys a sense of helplessness to the affected government and population. At the same time, it signals to other governments that they are not impervious to such attacks.

As the emerging Cold War theatrics and veto politics threaten to further paralyse the functioning of UNSC, the Ukraine crisis is unlikely to abate any time soon.

Kremlin’s increasingly assertive stance on the troop build-up along the Russia–Ukraine border can be viewed as not just prompted by Ukraine’s potential NATO membership but also as Russia underscoring its place as a stakeholder in shaping European security architecture.

It is possible, if there is political will, to find a negotiated settlement on the basis of a new constitution giving greater say to regions in foreign policy. In brief, the US should agree to a sort of Finlandization of Ukraine.

While the ceasefire is a much needed respite yet it does raise two questions: What made the key players arrive at such agreements? Can these deals facilitate the initiation of a political dialogue in Ukraine?

While the ‘compromise’, as put forth by Russia is a welcome development in so far it helps to diffuse the potential confrontation yet it does raise two pertinent questions: What made the key players arrive at such an agreement? And can this deal be implemented?

It is unlikely that Russia has serious plans to invade Ukraine and there is no reason to believe that EU or even US really wants a war. Yet, US, and perhaps Russia too, are prepared to play brinkmanship and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there can be a war that nobody wanted.