The commentary makes the case for reopening the Limited War debate in order to inform explicit articulation of a Limited War doctrine.

Workable options short of war, as ‘Cold Start Minor’ suggests, would serve as deterrent to informed by the logic of leaving something to chance.

As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region.

Non-articulation of India's strategic doctrine lends it to be interpreted and perceived variously. India's security establishment need not be defensive about its strategic doctrine but boldly take on critics in the strategic community. Besides, its articulation would help provide direction to the military in their formulation of military doctrine, planning and acquisitions.

The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand.

The Services have been doctrinally fecund over the past decade, with each Service bidding to pursue relatively distinct campaigns, which would amount to lack of synergy and the whole failing to rise higher than the sum of its parts.

Cold Start is a good doctrine from India’s point of view, but one that could adversely impact strategic stability given since Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is premised on countering Indian conventional military superiority with a nuclear shield.

To prevent intelligence failures there is a need to incorporate the additional and fresh areas of intelligence interest brought on by the asymmetric and nuclear dimensions of future conflict.