The objective of asking these question should be to elicit information that generates a well-informed debate on, and facilitates the result-oriented monitoring of, the MoD’s handling of matters related to the defence budget.

The share of defence expenditure in 2016-17 has gone below the levels it was in 1955-56. In 2017-18 it will go down to 1.557 per cent of GDP.

There is a plethora of evidence to show that the problem of establishing a Defence Modernisation Fund does not lie with any ‘rules of business’, but instead with its merit and workability.

Budget is not just all about figures but also a statement of policy. The Defence Budget for 2017-18 contains no hint of any intention of the government to bring about a paradigm shift in the defence policy.

There is a need to go beyond stale issues and have a more meaningful and dispassionate discussion on how to make the best use of the allocations made for defence.

Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.

While it may be tempting for the Niti Aayog to make deep inroads into defence planning, it would be wise to focus only on those areas that do not disturb the core function of defence preparedness.

Calculations reveal that the capital expenditure has been cut primarily to accommodate the rise in salary and pension bills arising out of the implementation of OROP scheme and the Seventh Central Pay Commission recommendations.

It is time India devised appropriate tactics to meet the current threat. It is imperative that the armed forces prepare for ‘the most likely scenario’ rather than ‘the worst case scenario’. But to be fair, this can only be done when there exists a clear national military policy/strategy.