India-China Relations

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • India’s Geostrategy and China: Mackinder versus Mahan?

    Two recent events exemplify India’s geopolitical dilemma. In early April 2013, it was reported that Chinese submarines had been conducting forays in the Indian Ocean that were apparently picked up by US Navy sonar.1 A few weeks later, there was a Chinese intrusion in the western sector where a platoon of Chinese troops entered the Depsang Valley area of eastern Ladakh.2 While the status quo ante was peacefully attained, the Ladakh incident is a vivid reminder of the abiding implications of an unresolved Himalayan dispute.

    July 2013

    Chinese Intrusion into Ladakh: An Analysis

    The intrusion by the Chinese Army in the Ladakh sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was first reported by the media on 15 April 2013. Initial reports indicated that about 30–40 armed soldiers of the Chinese Army had set up three to four tents in the area of Depsang Bulge, south east of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). Subsequently, media reports indicated that the Government had accepted this intrusion to be 19 km from the LAC, inside Indian territory.

    July 2013

    Srivatsan asked : Why should India collaborate with China in international climate change negotiations? Why should China be included in global south?

    Jagannath P. Panda replies: Like India, China has been of the view that there should be special categories to address the challenges of climate change in accordance with the interests and domestic priorities of the developing world. For example, taking the support of developing countries at the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, the head of the Chinese delegation, Xie Zhenhua, had stated: ‘climate change has emerged as a challenge basically due to unrestricted emissions by developed countries in their process of industrialisation, and developing countries remain the victims of climate change negotiation process’. Moreover, China has officially noted that it continues to help the developing countries to deal with the challenges of climate challenge, and that Beijing has earmarked $200 million in this regard. Also, China has financed climate change programmes in Africa, including in some least developed and small island countries; and, it has tried to bring a ‘South-South’ outlook in its stance on meeting the challenges posed by climate change.

    China to date remains the largest emitter of CO2 in the world and causes almost a quarter of the current global greenhouse gas emissions. Among the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa - India stands next to China as a leading emitter of CO2. BRICS, thus, is one forum where India must cooperate with China in climate change negotiations. Besides, China is also a member of BASIC along with Brazil, South Africa and India, where climate change issues are debated and addressed in an open manner. BASIC was created in December 2009 at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the COP15 in Copenhagen. The politics just before the COP15 sufficiently indicated that developed countries would not initiate steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if developing countries fail to do so, pointing mainly towards the two largest emitters from the developing world- China and India. Though in principle the BASIC countries agreed to carry forward climate change negotiations under the framework of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Roadmap, they realised that there has to be a greater understanding on the issue among the BASIC countries, making China-India cooperation a crucial one in this regard.

    Overall, both BRICS and BASIC justify the ‘South-South’ bonding to an extent, and offer a greater scope for cooperation in the ‘developing world’ on the issue of climate change. Therefore, India and China must cooperate in multilateral forums on climate change negotiations.

    Abhineet Singh asked: Should India adopt a more aggressive posture towards China?

    Reply: Kindly refer to the following recent & other publications on our website:

    V. Mahalingam, “Daulat Beg Oldie Standoff: An Assessment”, IDSA Issue Brief, May 22, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/DaulatBegOldiestandoff_vmahalingam_220513

    R. S. Kalha, “The Chinese Message and What Should the Reply Be?”, May 21, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheChineseMessageIndiareply_rskalha_210513

    Kasturi Moitra, “What India needs to learn from China”, May 20, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatIndianeedstolearnfromChina_kmoitra_200513

    Mukul Sanwal, “India and China: Strategic partners in global governance reform”, May 16, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandChinaStrategicpartners_msanwal_160513

    Mandip Singh, “Lure your enemy onto the roof, then take away the ladder”, May 13, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Lureyourenemyontotheroofthentakeawaytheladder_msingh_150513

    Arvind Gupta, “Chinese lessons in diplomacy”, May 12, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chineselessonsindiplomacy_agupta_120513

    Mandip Singh, “Lessons from Somdurong Chu Incident”, April 26, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/CurrentChineseincursionLessonsfromSomdurongChuIncident_msingh_260413

    Arvind Gupta, “China’s Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India”, April 25, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDefenceWhitePaper2013LessonsforIndia_agupta_250413

    Mandip Singh, “Critical Assessment of China's Vulnerabilities in Tibet”, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 30, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CriticalAssessmentofChinasVulnerabilitiesinTibet

    R. N. Das, “India-China Relations: A New Paradigm”, IDSA Monograph Series No. 19, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/monograph/IndiaChinaRelations_rndas

    Mandip Singh, “Increasing Chinese Footprint in India's North West: What should India do?”, October 21, 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/IncreasingChineseFootprintinIndiasNorthWest_msingh_211011

    Arvind Gupta, “China’s Changing Worldview”, August 4, 2009, at http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/ChinasChangingWorldview_AGupta_040809

    Chinese Premier's Visit: Ambiguity prevails

    The Chinese prime minister’s visit was in no way intended to offer solution to the vexed issue of border incursion. Li came to pursue China’s national interest and not to enrich India-China bilateral ties.

    May 31, 2013

    Chinese Premier's Visit: Tibet remains the core issue

    The Chinese prime minister’s visit was in no way intended to offer solution to the vexed issue of border incursion. Li came to pursue China’s national interest and not to enrich India-China bilateral ties.

    May 31, 2013

    Daulat Beg Oldie Standoff: An Assessment

    The culmination of the unprovoked Chinese intrusion in the Depsang Sector of Ladakh is a breather and a warning to India. It is a breather because it saves the country the embarrassment of justifying its inaction in dealing with the intrusion. Warning because, it gives yet another chance to set right the existing short comings in border management and deficiencies in the defence operational capabilities.

    May 22, 2013

    Pages

    Top