Rukmani Gupta replies: India and China share a long land border, parts of which are disputed. There is no consensus between the governments of the two countries on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and their respective perceptions of the LAC are also unclear. Keeping this in mind, reported Chinese incursions into Indian territory can have multiple interpretations. Two likely explanations may be: first, Chinese patrolling into disputed areas may be a means to assert Chinese claims on those areas and challenge Indian sovereignty; and second, Chinese actions could be aimed at gauging Indian responses. Reports regarding Chinese incursions in the Indian media have certainly become more frequent in the past few years.

Reply: Kindly refer to an earlier reply by Rukmani Gupta on a similar query posted in this section, at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/Chinasemergenceasone

S.D. Muni replies: Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are the basic tenets of engagement between sovereign states. Their violation by any party only produces conflict and tension as is evident in the case of India-China relations. It may be recalled that the peaceful co-existence agreement between India and China was for a designated time (only for eight years), which ended in 1962, before the Chinese imposed the war on India. These principles have no legal standing in the relations between the two countries now. You may have missed the fact that the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping has already come up with a new set of Panchsheel, redefining them from the 1954 text. Under the new Panchsheel, Xi proposed the following:

1. Maintain strategic communication and keep bilateral relations on the right track;
2. Harness each other's comparative strength and expand win-win cooperation;
3. Strengthen cultural ties and people to people relations;
4. Expand cooperation and coordination in multilateral affairs in the interest of developing countries; and
5. Accommodate each other’s core concerns.

These were a rehash of his predecessor Hu Jintao’s similar points announced in India in March 2012:

1. Maintain high level contacts and increase political trust;
2. Deepen practical cooperation;
3. Expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges;
4. Properly handle mutual differences and work for peace and stability; and
5. Strengthen communication and coordination to expand cooperation in international affairs.

Xi had proposed them in a BRICS meeting while addressing relations with India in March 2013. Obviously these (Xi's) principles have no reference to the resolution of the border dispute or to India's concerns regarding China otherwise. The only answer to the China-challenge for Indian policy makers is to build national capabilities to protect India's legitimate (not inflated or misconstrued) claims and interests. Until that is done, the principles proposed by China (and virtually endorsed by India) are as good as any other reasonable framework to avoid conflict and keep the bilateral engagement constructive. There is clear evidence that China does not want any conflict with India in the present context, as possibly it cannot afford it.

Rup Narayan Das replies: In order to put the issue in perspective, it is worth while to revisit history for a moment. Concerned at the growing Russian interests in Tibet in early 1900s, the British Government in India had sent a military mission to Lhasa under Col. Younghusband in 1904, which led to the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention the same year. By this agreement, the British secured the right to establish Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung in Tibet, as also a commitment about the express exclusion of any other foreign power from political influence there. Anticipating political complications in the region, the British Government invited both the Tibetan and Chinese representatives to a tripartite conference at Simla in October 1913. The draft tripartite convention while recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet also expressly stipulated for the autonomy of Tibet. China, however, declined to accept the convention. Subsequently, a bilateral agreement was signed between Tibet and Great Britain, and a formal declaration issued, barring the Chinese Government from enjoying any privileges accruing from the Simla Agreement so long as it did not ratify it. Thus, the McMahon line is based on the Simla Conference.

The Simla Agreement continued to be basis of Anglo-Tibetan relations till the British withdrawal from India in 1947. In July 1947, the British Government in India formally informed the Tibetan Government that after the transfer of power, British obligations and rights under the existing treaties would devolve upon India (for details, see Nancy Jetlly, India China Relations 1947-1977, Radiant Publishers, 1979, pp. 13-14). When India became independent on August 15, 1947, it acquired the latent boundary dispute with China in the Eastern sector - the McMahon Line.

On November 20, 1950, while responding to a question whether India has got any well-defined boundary with Tibet, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the parliament that the frontier from the eastwards has been defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Simla Convention. He declared, “Our map show that the McMahon line is our boundary - map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary and we will not allow anybody to come across its boundary”.